Socialism and Errors

A tentative thesis: 

The Soviet Union towards the end of  WWII made a mistake similar to the one the Paris Communards made who did not raid the Paris central bank (as Marx thought would have been sensible to pay their soldiers, etc), they did not invade Switzerland and confiscate the ill gotten stashes of the European bourgeoisie who evaded the affects of the carnage and continued to play the stock markets. Instead they acted, post war, in an increasingly imperialist fashion, emulating the bourgeois countries, imposing socialism and giving it, therefore, a bad name across Europe. Why leave Switzerland, the bank of the European bourgeoisie and one big bankroller of the Nazis, untouched? It is unfathomable if you are a communist to grasp why any communist would do this. The centre of European capitalism was, and remains, Switzerland. The answer to this question is key.

We are now living, therefore, in the aftermath of a kind of socialist funk, the result of a lack of resolution and theoretical understanding of Marxism. This is why Greece is so fascinating as a case in the crisis. The Cold War policies that made the Allies turn on the local communists who had bravely fought the Nazis meant Greece was facing years of rightist corruption and money lending to support an unpopular capitalism, it led to the reign of the Generals, and then to the joining of the Eurozone and now Greece’s massive debt crisis, all of it still being fuelled by debt.

The Class Struggles in Southern Europe (2)

Euro-area finance ministers approved the payout of 49.1 billion euros ($64 billion) of loans through March and committed to “additional measures” in case Greece’s debt reduction veers off track.
While another cut in bailout-loan rates and an increase in infrastructure funding would top the list of extra measures, the policy makers hinted that outright debt relief -- still a taboo topic in creditor countries led by Germany -- would be on the table as well.
http://www.ekathimerini.com/4dcgi/_w_articles_wsite1_1_13/12/2012_474302

The failure of the bond buy out target was waived very quickly, you might say they stopped short at appearing to bend over backwards to lend Greece more money, but that's all. And they still argue that Syriza (the radical left Greek party that advocates strong negotiation) would not have (had) any leverage!

From, for instance, Merkel's recent position on Greece as well as banking supervision, you can see that she does not act chiefly for her own nation as a whole but also and predominantly for her class as a cosmopolitan European entity. This is why Greece gets the bail out despite failing (and once again defaulting) to meet the criteria of the bond buy back, and why Merkel must sell the idea that Germany will not mutualise debt to her own ordinary citizens, while making sure that this is a future possibility. Each other bourgeois leader does similar, more-or-less, and is involved in the political charade.

So what does this mean for a future Europe?

While it shows that there can be compromises between the national interests, these interests are only compromised by trading with and often away the rights and interests of the lower classes (especially in the crisis), namely the general European working class. Where their own national bourgeois interests outweigh their general interest, national interests tend to win out, but this depends on the relative national power of the competing nation too. Germany is the biggest European economic power and can therefore better defend its own national interests while also ensure its cosmopolitan elite profits from the European project too. Notwithstanding, the national interest does not always coincide with the interests of the ruling national class, which is easier to see in Greece than in Germany of course, but is also just as true in Germany.

The big problem is the reality that is the present economic crisis. The progress of the crisis has been relentless, and the politics has run kind of parallel to it in a way that is consistently only really self interested, so it uses the crisis as a means to implement measures that the European ruling classes desired anyway, it is an opportunity for it, and it takes its opportunities like any opportunist would. But in doing so it tends to ignore the reality of the crisis or give to it only a passing nod of attention. So we have two paths that, in fits and starts, are diverging. The first path is the apparent political route to financial harmonization and federalism in the Eurozone, backed up by humanist rhetorical flourishes such as the recent Nobel Prize awarded (to the EU, or to itself you might say) for 'creating peace in Europe'. As well as proving a negative this piece of ridiculous hubris is set against a reality of harsh austerity measures deriving from its neoliberal policies which have generated poverty and some extreme reactions such as the rise of fascism in Greece and extreme rightist policies in Spain.

This clash of opposites has not yet become so sharp as to be able to puncture the smug pomposity of the Eurozone apparatchiks or the club of political leaders, who only see a slow and steady progress to something ill defined that could possibly be a federal social democratic Europe, but which looks like at the moment a vehicle for the richest nations to better exploit the poor of the poorest 'peripheral' nations at the behest of their lesser endowed bourgeoisie. Yet the problem of the economic crisis is not resolved either by the austerity or the manifold agreements to unify, at some stage, Europe. In actual fact the problems are exacerbated by these, at best partial illusions under the influence of which both the club of national leaders and Euro apparatchiks can drift into the self satisfaction that they have 'acted' and so at least absolved themselves from further responsibility. That in, say, Greece people are suffering, with a lack of a social safety net, from the effects of the crisis and the failure of their policies, can be set aside as something that exists as if in another dimension which cannot impinge on theirs. Of course, the contours of this partition between the two dimensions has, as well as ideological illusions, also some real aesthetic accoutrements, the repressive state apparatus that in the end enforces the will of the state by violence, the riot cops and suchlike.

The central core of the Eurozone ideology sees itself as a hero of peaceful diplomacy and soft power (to use an appropriate phrase from Saif's LSE doctoral thesis) belonging to its humanist-humanitarian ideals, which are in fact stressed in the European Charter, but just as this document is being trampled underfoot in the rush to austerity for the workers, the reality is one of implementing by increasingly authoritarian means anti-social and anti democratic policies. It is not that the European peoples have failed to notice this disparity, they have protested vigorously as we all know; the problem is what to do about it beyond mere protest. While, say, Egyptians are strenuously trying to get a democratic government at least as democratic as exists in a few nations central to Europe, European peoples are protesting against secular democratic governments and systems that have been achieved after similar long historical struggles. These governments and their democracies still appear to be advanced; they still appear to represent the people, and to belong to the people. This is democracy, how can they attack democracy without seeming to want despotism? So protests tend to flounder on the rocks of democracy itself, and/or the question of democracy begins to loom: what is it exactly? Why are we apparently failed by this system, yet we have the vote? Have we really voted to represent us these fools who have squandered money and got into enormous debt just because we, like them, became greedy? The poor became greedy!! The people are told this is how it was, that it was their choice and so also their fault as well as the fault of democracy (and its baggage of 'entitlements', the sense of entitlement, and the dignity that goes with that) itself that the crisis led to such huge debts. There is little room left here for a critique of democracy. The bourgeoisie say it is democracy or fascism, you choose one or the other, and the people do not want fascism, so it is democracy, this democracy. The question as to whether this democracy was ever truly representative is not to be discussed, it is a taboo subject. For on this assumption, that we have such a choice, rests the whole underlying bourgeois media story of ordinary folk being to blame for the crisis.

It is not the end of the matter though, again because the crisis is just too big and too deep. It has its own reality that will trump the measures and the illusions both. At some future point we can expect the opposition between the reality and the rhetoric of power to become too sharp. Even if, for instance, a federal states of Europe becomes increasingly a genuine possibility, long before this can happen the crisis will be also visiting Germany, and with that the problem of sharing the debt, as federal partners, or not. Indeed this crisis is likely to be both the motivation for federalism as a solution to the crisis and at the same time the reason why its biggest apparent exponent does not want it to be the solution. In the process we can expect that the debts will be smuggled and dispersed even more onto the shoulders of the European working classes, but as the consequences of austerity approaches the core, so too will the protests that follow it. The European project may not be about to fail formally, but it has in fact failed as a form of social democracy, the ideals of a harmonious Europe have been shattered and left behind and what we face is not necessarily a de facto break up of the Eurozone but its repressive iron fist poking out of threadbare holes in the soft glove in order to hold it together. That it may or may not break up is therefore a merely academic question, European nations are not about to sail away from Europe, but in actual fact what has been lost is already the most important part of it, you might say, its heart. It will be the task of the European workers to start it beating again, even though it was mostly fictitious in the first place, only they can give real heart to the heart of Europe.

by Gary Tedman

The Class Struggles in Southern Europe (1)

The embourgeoisment that has been enabled by the massive credit injection over the last years, plus the shifting to the super-exploitation of overseas workers ('outsourcing') rather than those at home, plus the expert predominance of bourgeois culture through the media, has seemed to create European societies without working classes. It is not that the economic relations of class difference have disappeared, far from it, but that these were smoothed over and erased as feelings, and so as corresponding ideas:- there is no working class culture, or if there is, it is rather like dark matter and dark energy in the cosmos (it is there, it has mass, has a huge effect, but it is unknown). This is one reason why the big economic crisis has had few obvious political effects by the standard routes so far. Parliaments remain what they are, representative democracies unshaken by the crisis, except in the places in Europe where the effects have been most acute, where the crisis brings the reality of class exploitation into sharper relief, Greece for example, where Syriza, a radical left party, has risen dramatically to become the second primary force, dissolving the hitherto entrenched certainties of the false dialectic of the 'balance' of pseudo Left and Right. What we see, therefore, is a slow dawning realization of the shakiness and falsity of the bourgeois sensibility and ideology as it comes into contradiction with the economic reality of the crisis for large sections of 'middle class' people who are being thrown down (losing their employment, being evicted from their homes, falling into debt and poverty).

One feature of this is and has been the sense of indignation (i.e. the 'Indignado' movement) that the 'middle class' sensibility has when it finds itself in this situation. To be 'indignant' expresses the loss of dignity, but also a dignified sense of that loss: so it is actually an assertion of dignity against the forces that are stripping it away. For this section of the people the relation between them and workers unions and the working class who also struggle, always, but also specifically now against the effects of the capitalist crisis in various, usually traditional, ways is not exactly or always harmonious, they grate against each other and jockey for position. So this is a cause of division among those who oppose such policies as the troika directed austerity drive, and prevent a Popular Front from being as effective as it could be, although things are still rapidly developing. The case of Argentina is mildly instructive, their earlier, similar, crisis led to the fall of governments and leaders, a great amount of suffering for ordinary people, inspirational uprisings, and a similar movement to the Indignados (the piquiteros, or pickets), but not so much has changed in terms of class division in Argentina, to an extent because of the separation of the opposition into factions and the lack of clarity about what was (and is) to be done.

This lack is to be expected and is not to be taken as a sign of failure, I suggest. The strongest positions become adopted through the struggle and not by imposition, but it is always necessary to point this up and engage in the ideological debate. Socialism remains the only real alternative to the neoliberal policies of the European bourgeoisie and its troika, whose aim is always to push more loans and debt as the answer, but there are so many illusions about what constitutes socialism, and illusions that are 'made real' and acted out too, that the broad Popular Front is the best current movement that serves these struggles. One fear is that 'socialist' or 'communists' wish to impose their 'grid' for revolutions upon these struggles, probably harking back to the USSR's socialist imperialism in Eastern Europe. This could not be further from Leninist principles, but nevertheless these feelings are widespread, there is a great deal of associating the name with the thing itself, as if all Communist Parties in Europe are by default therefore communist or Marxist, as if the act of naming alone means that. And then there is the question of democracy. Probably the most advanced critique of the current democracy in Europe is that of the updated Hannah Arendt version of performative democracy, which in the end and in practice seems to have the US republic as its ideal form, and so is very limited given this form is also currently being severely criticized as failing to represent. Will this theoretical limit form the actual limit of these anti-austerity protests? It looks as if Argentina reached this limit, a kind of buffer zone, hovering at the edge of something new, something greatly resisted by the established powers.

Gary Tedman

The 'Two Views' of Europe

There has been talk in the news recently of two contrasting views of the way Europe could emerge from the crisis: One strategy assumes it must take immediate steps toward debt mutualisation and needs either the European Central Bank (ECB) or an expanded European Stability Mechanism (ESM) to purchase distressed governments' bonds as soon as possible. Over time, this view has it, Europe would build the institutions needed to complement these policies: it would create a single bank supervisory body, build up the European commission's powers, and create a European Treasury, and strengthen the European parliament.

The other view being put forward is that to proceed with these new policies before the new institutions are in place would be reckless; it thinks that mutualising debts before European institutions have a veto over fiscal policies and going forward with capital injections before the single supervisory body is in place would only encourage more risk taking. Additionally, allowing the ECB to supervise the banks before the European parliament acquires the power to hold it accountable would worsen the EU's apparent lack of democracy.

The second view has not, however, placed democracy as its primary reason for the apparent reticence. It has mostly asserted that what is needed first is fiscal control over apparently unruly governments and state authorities, and that it wishes to build these institutions and powers first. Note that reckless government spending is put forward as the reason for this authority needing to be in place, even though it has been widely observed that private financial enterprises and banks have been the main source of needs for bail outs from public accounts. It is also not entirely evident that the European authorities such as they are prefer a political establishment or governments that are fiscally responsible in the terms that they seem to be suggesting. In fact they have supported New Democracy in Greece and the coalition including Pasok, which are the two parties that between them have the most responsibility for the lamentable condition of the state finances in Greece.

So is it a question of tardiness over fiscal authority due to possible risk, or merely unwillingness to move forward unless they have in place their preferred political parties? Or is it something else that is holding up proceedings? It does not appear to be a desire to have democracy in place first. In fact democracy would be a hindrance to the proposed fiscal authority, since it might not be wanted, and what we are seeing is a set of projections for the future put forward, already, by an authority. This authority decides to keep itself in the background, but from the talks on the need for fiscal authority it is clear that this desire must come from somewhere, from some already existing authority. This authority, therefore, is seeking greater powers, not mere existence, and it would be to reduce their powers to put their authority at the mercy of democratic oversight.

So in fact we have an already existing power deciding to delay because of the lack of power it perceives over its own authority. This power can see the reason for swift injections of capital to the European nations' central banks, but does not do so because, for some reason, it sees hurdles that must be overcome, such as to give it more power. So one of these reasons is presumably simply that it wants more power and can use monetary need as leverage, but is there other reasons? Capital injections from the ECB or ESM straight to banks would be a step on the road to mutualisation of Euro debt; the northern economies would be sharing the burden with the southern states that are in financial trouble, which would mean that their economies become more risky according to the markets. Perhaps this also could be a source of delay, a certain amount of protectionism of the northern economies. They are, after all, also capitalist competitors. As competitors, it stands to reason that some reward would be wanted for the sharing of risk, it is a point of strategic leverage, so this also implies more power is being sought, and that there is a lack of trust among competitors.

Is this central power guided by principles of European fraternity or is it guided by the principles of capitalism and neoliberal free market ideology? All factual evidence points to the latter. The logic of fiscal authority has been put forward under the banner of austerity and with the spin that it is profligate governments that are and have been to blame for the crisis, implicating democracy and the peoples' choices and sense of entitlement to welfare as a problem. There has been a particular focus on Greece where this story can be told in the most convincing fashion, because of its history and particular level of state corruption. Yet even in Greece the corruption of the state is due to private graft and the ability of the wealthy to escape from taxes, so that state money ends one way or another in private hands. Despite this, the 'troika' of lenders still wanted the old duopoly of state power to keep control, and threatened dire consequences if this was strayed from. And of course the state power persist with the austerity measures and the neoliberal ideology that it is peoples' entitlements that are the main cause of the crisis.

What does this ideology achieve? Three things: 1) it deflects from the real causes of the crisis; 2) in doing so deflects from the real solution to the crisis; 3) it pulls to the extreme right at a time when the left and socialism is resurgent. The extreme right is seen as political protection, a buffer, against the left, which have grown in stature (such as the rise of Syriza in Greece) simply as a result of the perceived failures of free market capitalism and neoliberal rightist policy. This left is not the standard left of duopoly politics but a new and more genuine kind, and is therefore not trusted by the traditional order.

Gary Tedman