Showing posts with label Economic crisis. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Economic crisis. Show all posts

Tuesday, October 23, 2012

Neoliberalism, Marx and the 'Marginal Revolution'

Neoliberalism is a contemporary form of economic liberalism that emphasizes the efficiency of private enterprise, liberalized 'free' trade and open markets to promote globalization (a term which might also be interpreted as neo-imperialism). Neoliberals therefore seek to maximize the role of the 'private sector' in determining the political and economic priorities of the world. Neoliberalism seeks to transfer control of the economy from 'public sector' (or state) to the 'private sector' under the belief that it will produce a more efficient government and improve the economy.

The definitive statement of the concrete policies advocated by neoliberalism is often taken to be John Williamson's 'Washington Consensus', - a list of policy proposals that appeared to have gained consensus approval among the Washington-based international economic organizations such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank. Though apparently not Williamson's original intent, the Washington Consensus has anyway become synonymous with the ideas of neoliberal market fundamentalism.

Some claim that Chicago School economists are associated with Washington Consensus The 'Chicago school' of economics describes the neoclassical school of thought within the academic community of economists focusing around the faculty of The University of Chicago, sometimes referred to as the 'freshwater school' of economics in contrast to the 'saltwater school' based in US coastal universities, notably Harvard, MIT, and Berkeley; Chicago is considered one of the world's foremost economics departments; Milton Friedman taught there for more than three decades. A significant body of economists and policy-makers argues that what was wrong with the Washington Consensus as originally formulated by Williamson had less to do with what was included than with what was missing in it, arguing that it was an incomplete project, and that countries in Latin America and elsewhere need to move beyond 'first generation' macroeconomic and trade reforms to a stronger focus on productivity-boosting reforms and direct programs to support the poor.

How did we get to this point in economic science?

'Classical economics' is the term used for the first modern school of economics. The publication of Adam Smith's Wealth of Nations in 1776 is considered to be the birth of the school. Perhaps the central idea behind it is on the ability of the market to be self-correcting as well as being the most superior institution in allocating resources. The implicit assumption is: that all individuals maximize their economic activity. At the root of Smith's modernity, though, is his and Marx's philosophical attitude towards the object of their enquiry and the way this grasped the concept, crucial to economic theory, of value.

The so-called 'paradox of value', or the diamond–water paradox, is the apparent contradiction that, although water is more useful in terms of human survival than diamonds, diamonds command a higher price in the market; Adam Smith is the classic presenter of this paradox. To paraphrase Smith: the one may be called 'value in use' and the other, 'value in exchange', the things which have the greatest value in use often have little or no value in exchange; on the contrary, those which have the greatest value in exchange have frequently little or no value in use; nothing is more useful than water, for example, but it will purchase almost nothing; almost nothing can be gained in exchange for it, whilst a diamond has scarce any use-value; but a very great quantity of other goods may frequently be had in exchange for it. For Smith, the real price of every thing, what every thing really costs to the person who wishes to acquire it, is the toil of acquiring and making it, so Smith thereby denied a necessary relationship between price and utility, and price in this view was related to productive labor. In this he was followed by Marx. Advocates of the labor theory of value saw it as the philosophically materialist resolution of the paradox of value.

The so-called 'marginal revolution' which is based on the subjective theory of value, that is understood to have occurred in Europe, led by Carl Menger, William Stanley Jevons, and Leon Walras, gave rise to what is known as the neo-classical synthesis. As we have seen, Marx had developed and used the materialist concept of use-value versus exchange value. Use-value was classically understood to give some measure of objective material usefulness. This was later 'rebranded' in the 'marginal revolution' as 'marginal benefit', which is understood as the utility of a thing counted in terms of 'common units of value', while exchange value is given as the measure of how much one good was priced in terms of another, namely what is now called relative price. The subjective theory of value identifies value as based in the inner desires and needs of the members of a society, as opposed to value being inherent to an object that exists independently of any observer or user. Once this idealist epistemology is taken as the given grounds, it is able to refer to the units of value as subjective units. Today, the marginal utility of a good or service is seen as the utility gained (or lost) from an increase (or decrease) in the consumption of that good or service, so it is the action of subjective consumption that defines the value not the objective existence of the object. Economists therefore sometimes speak of a law of diminishing marginal utility, meaning that the first unit of consumption of a good or service yields more utility than the second and subsequent units.

The concept of marginal utility played a defining conceptual role in the (so-called) marginal revolution of the late 19th century that led to the replacement of the labor theory of value of Adam Smith and Karl Marx by neoclassical value theory in which the relative prices of goods and services are thought to be simultaneously determined by marginal rates of substitution in consumption and marginal rates of transformation in production, which are apparently equal in 'economic equilibrium'. This neo-classical formulation had also been formalized by Alfred Marshall. However, it was the concept of the general equilibrium of Walras that helped solidify the research in economic science as a mathematical and deductive enterprise, the essence of which is still defined as neo-classical and makes up what is currently found in mainstream economics textbooks today. The key implication is usually that what is new (revolutionary) here is the scientific rigor, i.e. that Marx specifically is not supposed to have. In actual fact this rigor is precisely what is missing in this fudge and mystification of use value and exchange value through the concept of the marginal, which serves to obscure its idealist philosophical roots.

Macroeconomics in its modern form began with the publication of John Maynard Keynes's General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money in 1936. Keynes projected an aggregated framework to explain macroeconomic behavior, leading us to the current distinction between micro and macroeconomics. According to Keynesian theory, some individually-rational microeconomic-level actions—if taken collectively by a large proportion of individuals and firms—can lead to inefficient amassed macroeconomic outcomes, wherein the economy operates below its potential output and growth rate. Such a situation had previously been referred to by classical economists as a general glut, which in Marx is described as overproduction. Keynesian economics argues that private sector decisions sometimes lead to these inefficient macroeconomic outcomes and, therefore, advocates interventionist policy responses by the public sector, including monetary policy actions by the central bank and fiscal policy actions by the government to stabilize output over the 'business cycle'. Of special importance in Keynes' theories was his explanation of economic behavior as also being led by 'animal spirits'. In this sense, it limited the role for the so-called rational (maximizing) agent. In fact, this foundational ideology of a division of the rational ('angelic') and the irrational ('bestial') in the human subject seems to underpin the whole of modern post Smithian-Marxian economics, as well as the accepted division of macro from microeconomic theory. It avoids confronting the concept and existence of contradiction in the economic system by founding any antagonism ultimately in innate human attributes; although this underlying thesis is rarely invoked as such (it could sound racist), it is nevertheless always implied.

The neo-classical school dominated the field up until the event of the Great Depression. When the Great Depression struck, classical economists (other than Marx), had difficulty explaining how goods could go unsold and workers could be left unemployed, thus with Keynes's publication, certain of its assumptions were rejected. Keynes argued the solution to the Great Depression was to stimulate the economy ('inducement to invest') through a combination of two approaches: a reduction in interest rates and government investment in infrastructure; the theory has it that investment by government injects income, which results in more spending in the general economy, which in turn stimulates more production and investment involving still more income and spending and so on and so forth. The initial stimulation is seen as beginning a concatenation of events, whose total increase in economic activity is a multiple of the original investment; it does not explain why the situation arises in the first place, i.e. why the investments that have taken place always/already in the economy are not producing this effect, or the answer is left simply as a fault of policy. The Post-World War II period saw the widespread implementation of Keynesian economic policy in the United States and Western European countries. Its dominance in the field by the 1970s was best reflected by the controversial statement attributed to ex-President Richard Nixon and economist Milton Friedman: "We are all Keynesians now."

A central conclusion of Keynesian economics is that, in some situations, no strong automatic mechanism moves output and employment towards full employment levels. This conclusion conflicts with economic approaches that assume a strong general tendency towards 'equilibrium'. In the 'neoclassical synthesis', which combines Keynesian macro concepts with a micro foundation, the conditions of general equilibrium allow for price adjustment to eventually achieve this goal. General equilibrium theory seeks to explain the behavior of supply, demand, and prices in a whole economy with several or many interacting markets, by seeking to prove that a set of prices exists that will result in an overall equilibrium. What here seems to have been omitted is the political as such, politics is subordinated to a technical and instrumental understanding of the problem, and (for instance) an effect, prices, are treated as a cause, or as both cause and effect of its own function. Generally speaking any material foundations or groundings are lost.

With microeconomics, macroeconomics is now one of the two most general fields in economics; the fact that macroeconomics is 'smaller' than economics seems to render the terms faintly ridiculous, notwithstanding. Macroeconomics (from Greek prefix "makros-" meaning "large" + "economics") is the branch of modern economics dealing with the performance, structure, behavior, and decision-making of the whole economy. This includes a national, regional, or global economy. Macroeconomists study aggregated indicators such as GDP, unemployment rates, and price indices to understand how the whole economy functions. They develop models that explain the relationship between such factors as national income, output, consumption, unemployment, inflation, savings, investment, international trade and international finance. In contrast, microeconomics is primarily focused on the actions of individual agents, such as firms and consumers, and how their behavior 'determines' prices and quantities in specific markets.

New classical macroeconomics, sometimes simply called new classical economics, is a school of thought in macroeconomics that builds its analysis on the neoclassical framework; specifically, it emphasizes the importance of supposedly rigorous foundations based on microeconomics. Macroeconomics descended from the hitherto divided fields of business cycle theory and monetary theory. The quantity theory of money was particularly influential prior to World War II. It took many forms including the version based on the work of Irving Fisher. His work on the quantity theory of money inaugurated the school of economic thought known as monetarism. Both Milton Friedman and James Tobin called Fisher "the greatest economist the United States has ever produced." New classical macroeconomics strives to provide neoclassical microeconomic foundations for macroeconomic analysis; this is in contrast with its rival, the new Keynesian school that uses microfoundations such as 'price stickiness' and imperfect competition to generate macroeconomic models similar to earlier, Keynesian ones.

Problems arose in the Keynesian theory in the 1970s and early 1980s with the onset of 'stagflation'. Stagflation is a situation in which the inflation rate is high and the economic growth rate slows down but unemployment also remains high. The reasons for this were and are often placed upon factors such as oil. The decade of the 1970s saw rising oil prices caused by an OPEC oil embargo on the United States. This oil embargo ostensibly caused both high inflation and a steep economic downturn that in turn generated high unemployment. However, the question arises: what caused the high oil prices in the first place? Is the price of oil an extra economic factor, or totally political? And what was the politics based on which here apparently 'caused' the higher price of oil, if not economic factors? Keynesians were perplexed by the outbreak of stagflation because the original concept of the Phillips curve ruled out concurrent high inflation and high unemployment. The Phillips curve is a historical apparent inverse relationship between the rate of unemployment and the rate of inflation in an economy. Put simply, the lower the unemployment in an economy, the higher the rate of inflation should be. The new classical school emerged in the 1970s as a response to this failure of Keynesian economics to explain stagflation.

During the 1970s in the United States and several other industrialized countries, the Phillips curve concept and analysis became less popular. The new classical and monetarist criticisms led by Robert Lucas, Jr. and Milton Friedman respectively forced the rethinking of Keynesian economics. In particular, Lucas made the 'Lucas critique' that cast doubt on the Keynesian model. The Lucas critique suggested that if we want to predict the effect of a policy experiment, we should model the 'deep parameters' that govern individual behavior, because only such deep models can avoid merely aggregating previous policy; only then can we predict what individuals will do, taking into account the change in policy, and then aggregate the individual decisions to calculate the macroeconomic effects of the policy change. His idea of deep, though, only meant relating to preferences, technology and resource constraints and not a deeper theoretical model in the sense of its philosophical foundations (such as the theory of value). This nevertheless strengthened the case for macro models to be based on microeconomics.

Milton Friedman (July 31, 1912 - November 16, 2006) had already proposed before the phenomenon of stagflation that the Phillips curve did not exist and would fail. On this basis he theorized the existence of a 'natural rate of unemployment' that contradicted the then accepted relationship between inflation and unemployment rate, and this became a concept fundamental to monetarist economics, on which also worked Lucas Papademos (who was to become the 'technocratic' prime minister of Greece during the 2011-12 years of the crisis,; in January 2012 he warned that workers would have to accept cuts in income for a default to be avoided, he also told business and labor leaders that the 'troika'—the European Union, the IMF and the European Central Bank—was looking for Greece to take steps to open up so-called closed professions, as well as adjustments to the minimum wage, abolition of Christmas and summer vacation 'bonuses' and automatic wage increases) and Franco Modigliani. As far as many economists were concerned, the Phillips curve had little or no theoretical basis anyway. Critics like Friedman argued that the Phillips curve could not be a fundamental characteristic of economic general equilibrium because it showed a correlation between a real economic variable (the unemployment rate) and an only nominal economic variable (the inflation rate). Their counter-analysis was that government macroeconomic policy (primarily monetary policy) was being driven by a low unemployment target and that this caused expectations of inflation to change, so that steadily accelerating inflation rather than reduced unemployment was the result.

In economics, 'adaptive' expectations means that people form their expectations about what will happen in the future based on what has happened in the past. For example, if inflation has been higher than expected in the past, people would revise their expectations for the future. Chicago macroeconomic theory, as above rejected Keynesianism in favor of monetarism until the mid-1970s, when it turned to new classical macroeconomics based on the concept of rational expectations. Rational expectations is a hypothesis in economics which holds that agents' predictions of the future value of economically relevant variables are not systematically wrong in that all errors are random. Equivalently, this is to say that agents' expectations equal true statistical expected values. An alternative formulation is that rational expectations are model-consistent expectations, in that the agents inside the model assume the model's predictions are valid. Since most macroeconomic models today study decisions over many periods, the expectations of workers, consumers and firms about future economic conditions are an essential part of the model. How to model these expectations has long been controversial, and it is well known that the macroeconomic predictions of the model may differ depending on the assumptions made about expectations (e.g. see Cobweb model).

To assume rational expectations in this view is to assume that agents' expectations may be individually wrong, but are correct on average. In other words, although the future is not fully predictable, agents' expectations are assumed not to be systematically biased and use all relevant information in forming expectations of economic variables. This way of modeling expectations was originally proposed by John F. Muth (1961) and later became influential when it was used by Robert E. Lucas Jr. and others. Modeling expectations is crucial to all models which study how a large number of individuals, firms and organizations make choices under uncertainty. For example, negotiations between workers and firms will be influenced by the expected level of inflation, and the value of a share of stock is dependent on the expected future income from that stock.

Rational expectations theory is the basis for the 'efficient market hypothesis' (efficient market theory). If a security's price does not reflect all the information about it, then there exist 'unexploited profit opportunities': someone can buy (or sell) the security to make a profit, thus driving the price toward equilibrium. In the strongest versions of these theories, where all profit opportunities have been exploited, all prices in financial markets are deemed 'correct' and reflect market fundamentals (such as future streams of profits and dividends). Each financial investment is as good as any other, while a security's price reflects all information about its intrinsic value.

The idea behind the natural rate hypothesis put forward by Friedman was that any given labor market structure must involve a certain amount of unemployment, including 'frictional' unemployment associated with individuals changing jobs and possibly classical unemployment described as arising from real wages being held above the market-clearing level by minimum wage laws, trade unions or other labor market institutions. Unexpected inflation might allow unemployment to fall below the 'natural rate' by temporarily depressing real wages, but this effect would dissipate once the expectations about inflation were corrected. Only with continuously accelerating inflation could rates of unemployment below the 'natural rate' be maintained. The resulting prescription was that government economic policy (or at least monetary policy) should not be influenced by any level of unemployment below a critical level, the so-called 'natural rate'.

The analysis supporting the natural rate hypothesis proved controversial, because empirical evidence suggested that the 'natural rate' varied over time in ways that could not easily be explained by changes in labor market structures. And the analysis is especially problematic if the Phillips curve displays 'hysteresis', that is, if episodes of high unemployment raise the rate. This could happen, for example, if unemployed workers lose skills so that employers prefer to bid up of the wages of existing workers when demand increases, rather than hiring the unemployed. As a result of such problems the 'natural rate' terminology was largely dropped in favor of the NAIRU (Non-Accelerating Inflation Rate of Unemployment) , which referred to a rate of unemployment below which inflation would accelerate, but did not imply a commitment to any particular theoretical explanation, or a prediction that the rate would be stable over time. In short, the conceptual basis of the concept was left fallow, undecided, and ambiguous. There is no theoretical basis for predicting the NAIRU. The NAIRU theory was mainly intended as an argument against active Keynesian demand management and in favor of free markets (at least on the macroeconomic level).

Friedman was an economic advisor to conservative President Ronald Reagan, and his political philosophy extolled the virtues of a free market economic system with minimal intervention. In his 1962 book Capitalism and Freedom, he advocated policies such as a volunteer military, freely floating exchange rates, abolition of medical licenses, a negative income tax, and education vouchers. His ideas concerning monetary policy, taxation, privatization and deregulation influenced government policies, especially during the 1980s, and his monetary theory influenced the Federal Reserve's response to the current global financial crisis (2008-12). The advent of the global financial crisis in 2008 caused some resurgence in Keynesian thought and the Chicago school came under attack and has been at least partly blamed for the growing income inequality in the United States. Economist Brad DeLong of the University of California, Berkeley for instance says the Chicago School has experienced an 'intellectual collapse', while Nobel laureate Paul Krugman of Princeton University, said that recent comments from Chicago school economists were "the product of a Dark Age of macroeconomics in which hard-won knowledge has been forgotten." Critics also charged that the school's belief in human rationality contributed to bubbles such as seen in the financial crisis, and that the school's trust in markets to self-regulate has offered no aid to the economy in the wake of the crisis. The 'new Keynesian' view of the backlash rests on microeconomic models that indicate that nominal wages and prices are 'sticky', i.e. do not change easily or quickly with changes in supply and demand, so that quantity adjustment prevails. According to Paul Krugman, "while I regard the evidence for such stickiness as overwhelming, the assumption of at least temporarily rigid nominal prices is one of those things that works beautifully in practice but very badly in theory." This integration is further spurred by the work of other economists that questions rational decision-making in a perfect information environment as a necessity for micro-economic theory. Imperfect decision-making such as that investigated by Joseph Stiglitz underlines the importance of the management of risk in the economy. Notwithstanding, over time, many macroeconomists have returned to the IS-LM model and the Phillips curve as a first approximation of how an economy works. New versions of the Phillips curve, such as the 'Triangle Model', allow for stagflation, since the curve can shift due to supply shocks or changes in built-in inflation. In the 1990s, the original ideas of 'full employment' had been modified by the NAIRU doctrine. NAIRU advocates suggest restraint in combating unemployment, in case accelerating inflation should result. However, it is unclear exactly what the value of the NAIRU should be—or whether it even exists.

What seems obvious to any reader of Marx is that the effort in modern economics is to avoid looking at contradictions in the capitalist mode of production and how these contradictions enter into the ideology of the economy, the illusions about what the economy is doing and how it is working. Both the Keynesian and Friedmanite economic theories tackle significant problems and proffer solutions to actual economic strife, but they do so one-sidedly so that they are still unable to explain significant factors commonly occurring in the economy: high unemployment while high inflation (stagflation) for Keynes, and now, the collapse of neoliberal economics in the same kind of crisis. Neither form of the perfect market exists in which their respective theories would make sense, yet also putting them together in their positivist (a priori pre-Marxian) synthesis provides no way out. Many other commentators have suggested going back to basics and to the concept of value to look for answers. To look at one, specifically, there are the arguments of Ecological Economics: for this understanding the primary example of the concept of value in neo-classical economics is 'market value', or 'willingness to pay', which is the principal method of accounting used in 'receiver-type' theories, where the receiver (the 'interpreter of the world') determines the value. By contrast, in Ecological Economics value theory is separated into two types: 'donor-type' value and 'receiver-type' value. Ecological economists tend to believe that 'real wealth' needs a donor-determined value as a measure of what things were needed to make an item or generate a service (H.T. Odum 1996). Marx's and the Smithian labor theory of value and the 'Energy' concept is in this interpretation 'donor-type' value theories. Energy theorists, agreeing perhaps with Marx's concept of labor power, believe that this conception of value has relevance to all of philosophy, economics, sociology and psychology as well as Environmental Science (something which Marx was of course aware of long ago).

It is worth noting finally again how these ideas of value are inevitably epistemological (theory of knowledge) definitions and these definitions have inevitable political overtones. The two great camps of philosophy are materialist and idealist. In short, materialism holds that matter exists independently of thought, while idealism takes the contrary view. Marx and Smith's concept of value in their economic theory is philosophically speaking materialist in its theory of knowledge: In this, it is not the receiver's understanding and subjective valuation on the market which determines value, or the movements of the market itself, which would only explain the market by the market and therefore be tautological, but the independent properties of the entity combined with human labor power. Marx (in Volume I of Capital) distinguishes the value of a commodity into its use-value (utility) and exchange (market) value, both of which (aside from naturally occurring use values) are produced through the labor process by labor power, human effort or energy. This division is a theoretical distinction however, and not an absolute epistemological division. A characteristic of modern economics is to take exchange value as the dominant side, to extend its dominance to include dominance over use value, and then to regard this as the actual manifestation of the truth of philosophical idealism, of abstraction and the mind over matter, which in all other respects is the dominance of capital over labor, or as Marx says the dominance of dead labor over living.

Gary Tedman


Thursday, June 16, 2011

The Greek Crisis (June 2011)

by Gary Tedman

BBC:
"Berlin, backed by the Dutch, Austrians, and Finns, have been arguing for weeks that there can be no new bailout of Greece without the country's private creditors being forced to suffer losses on their loans. Otherwise, they argue, European taxpayers will be shouldering the costs while the international banks pocket the proceeds.

The ECB, the European Commission and other EU countries led by France argue that this could pave the way to disaster, with the financial markets decreeing the compulsory "haircuts" on private bondholders a Greek default, a "credit event" that could lay waste to the single currency.

"We are against any sort of default with haircuts and any form of private-sector event that could lead to a credit event or a rating event," Constancio said."
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/jun/15/europe-warned-greece-financial-crisis

So we have an impasse, both positions make no sense. This was bound to happen sooner or later. They do not want default, but they do not want 'haircuts' on the loans, and they do not want the single currency to fail. But Germany also does not want to keep bailing out the bad loans that it and the other Euro big nations have made. In effect, what they are saying is that they wanted the Eurozone if it meant they win from it financially, but not if they have any responsibility for losses. This represents the position of the German ruling class, but not all, because some German banks will want the endless bail outs, because it is they who need bailing out. And some big French banks too. But anyone can see that this must come to an end somewhere. The debts are unsustainable and so are its bailing out. Something has to give. The ordinary people cannot keep being made to give up their public wealth to the private banks. Even if they did, at the end of that road exists a notional single private bank owning all public debt and assets (i.e. owning Greece), and thus becoming effectively the state, i.e. that would be de facto socialism of one type or another, probably national socialism. No capitalist wants that solution in general, for this is why they break up monopolies (because they in the end mean the death of capitalism as such), but each individual capitalist entity, fighting for their share and to avoid taking the hit, will not try to prevent it, they only want to protect themselves.

So what will happen? What can happen? Greece will default one way or another. Either Germany or Greece or both will have to effectively withdraw from the Eurozone, at least as a financial structure. Or can it be fudged, they take on the option of the haircuts but try to call it something other than a default?

This seems to have been tried, but it does not fool anyone, it is still a default. And even if suiccessful, Greece still defaults. In fact the bail outs would have to be a permanent feature of a united European currency for the long term, as for instance California in the USA is a part of the USA. But Europe is not united in this way, it is just set up for the benefit of the big nations, and these do not want the responsibilities of a real central government, so they will each go their separate way if this is political issue is left unresolved. So the German project of a unified Europe flounders on its own selfishness and the profligacy and greed of its banks. Its 'sober' and 'successful' capitalism eats itself.

How the mighty have fallen from their self made pedestals.

It looks like they might just try to stave off the culmination of this crisis, yet again In a sense they seem to be waiting for the Greek people to decide what they will do, given it is only they who have any choice and power at this time, the politicians are too hampered by their masters the banks, who want two things at the same time which are in contradiction to each other. Yet the politicians also fight the Greek people with all the forces at their disposal, because they wish to blame the people for their plight, so they are also hampering any (albeit temporary) conclusion to the crisis in this way too. So even on this front there is an unsustainable stasis. An event is awaited, a spark that will change things, some fortuitous or unfortuitous happening. The bourgeoisie keep things the same, they prolong, and cross their fingers, shuffling the lame parliament, trying to reinvigorate the semblance of democracy, for no particular reason than their is nothing else left to do.

Friday, April 30, 2010

The 'Endarkenment' and the Euro Debt Fiasco in the Cradle of Western Civilization (Greece)

By Gary Tedman

I found this, I think, brilliant term (to 'endarken', implying the opposite to enlighten, to confuse and obfuscate) mentioned by the blogger 'suav' on a BBC blog. The writer says it was from Polish youth.

The principles of 'endarkenment' are working well in the Press these days while they try hard to disassociate the current sovereign debt crisis (Greece and so on) from the earlier banking crisis (Lehman collapse), whilst constantly trying to highlight the 'recovery', but the fact that the latter crisis developed from out of the former will not go away, it is history and it shapes events anyway.

From an article in the Independent online edition "Sean O'Grady: Greece is a problem – but Spain could destroy the euro" Friday, 30 April 2010, a useful timeline of the current shenanigans is given:

See:
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/business/comment/sean-ogrady-greece-is-a-problem-ndash-but-spain-could-destroy-the-euro-1958682.html


"2 May IMF talks in Athens with Greek officials end
3-6 May French parliament expected to approve rescue package
3-10 May IMF board, EU Commission have to formally approve the deal
6-7 May Greek parliament votes on new three-year austerity programme
6-10 May German Bundestag expected to endorse the deal, the last of those required to, the Netherlands and Luxembourg already having given tacit approval
9 May Key elections in North Rhine-Westphalia, Germany's most populous state
10 May European summit formally endorses the deal
19 May Next repayment of Greek debt; €8.5bn must be in place if Greece wants to avoid default
31 May €355m debt repayment due
Summer/autumn 2010 Threat of widespread strikes and unrest in Greece at harshness of deal; risk of political instability or that the government might fall
29 September Further €180m debt repayment due
2011 Greece needs to refinance the equivalent of 18 per cent of its GDP, or €23bn, with almost €9bn due on 20 March 2011. Annual deficit down to 9 per cent of GDP. Return to world growth should help
2012 Annual deficit down to 3 per cent of GDP by year end"

From http://www.independent.co.uk/news/business/comment/sean-ogrady-greece-is-a-problem-ndash-but-spain-could-destroy-the-euro-1958682.html

To illuminate this from NYTimes "As Greek Drama Plays Out, Where Is Europe?", Published: April 29, 2010, Steven Erlanger writes:

from http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/30/world/europe/30europe.html?hp


“The fact that a German regional election can play such a disproportionate role in messing up efforts to contain what was a much smaller crisis several months ago is astonishing,”

Mr. Kirkegaard said. And the fact that there will be no European Union summit meeting until May 10, after the German elections, “is so blatantly political,” he said.

“This is no way for an E.U. that has to contain an accelerating crisis and market panic to behave,” Mr. Kirkegaard said.


"...the Lisbon Treaty that created Mr. Van Rompuy’s position, and which was intended to make the enlarged European Union more agile and coherent, deliberately left out powers for coordinating fiscal policies, which are the fiercely guarded prerogative of the separate nations. Even so, countries like Germany can only blame themselves for not insisting on realistic European oversight of Greek statistics, which were widely believed to be false for two decades."

(…)


“Questions are asked to nations, not to the E.U. — but nations cannot deal with this problem alone,” said Dominique Reynié, director of the Foundation for Political Innovation and a political scientist at the Institut d’Études Politiques de Paris.

“The silence of the E.U. and its institutions has become deafening. It is incapable of demonstrating that an entity called Europe exists. This is a situation that cannot go on.”

"...The European Union “seems to be in a state of permanent self-promotion,” he said. “But it cannot ask its voters to relinquish part of their nations’ sovereignty and then not answer the call when there’s a problem.”…."

from http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/30/world/europe/30europe.html?hp


Well… it has… so far; Merkel is, or was, trying still to put off any vote to ratify a loan in Germany until May 10 after the elections there, when it 'is expected' to be agreed by the whole Bundestag, all of whom are (weirdly, given they are still 'expected' to agree it) voicing strong anti-bail-out sentiments, and thus making her job rather more difficult. This would, if achieved, exculpate her party from sole responsibility for dumping the crisis onto the backs of German workers again.

Meanwhile neither the Greek nor the German working people want a bail out. They didn't cause the crisis.

Yes, the Greek and German people agree, they don't want a bail out which will just make them suffer more and help make the bankers and bourgeoisie even more wealthy (yet again). But the politicians, they want a bail out and don't want it all at the same time. The one's who stand to lose from a default want the bail out, but the others who want the euro low for exports want the falling euro, they also fear more for their personal political position. If both lots look at the future though, they see whole rounds of bail outs being necessary, including very probably for themselves, but will there be any money left in the kitty after a few have gone to the wall? Unlikely. But they won't worry about the future much.

Thus the current 'solution' is letting things slide, the anarchy of the market. And the longer the politicians dither about the loan the higher its price becomes and the more serious the social consequences of 'contagion', but it doesn't matter to these politicians because they know they won't be paying the price anyway, this will be taken on by the working classes of Europe, who they seek to be elected by (!), thus what matters to them is their own political futures. After all, the founding members of the EU wanted Greece on board for the benefits, to collude and trade with, not for its social problems, not to share responsibility for looking after the people who they are meant to represent, just for swapping them as a cheap labour force.

At the moment the world is being led by credit rating agencies, big investment banks, and big speculators (this is almost always the case in capitalism, but it is now very visible in the crisis). The main credit rating agencies are anointed by the SEC, based in New York they are private financial corporations that wield a lot of power and influence and are a part of the problem, they are not independent and 'objective' as is often made out, but have vested interests. Their judgements are as political as they are economic. The SEC was once run by Bernie Madoff, now in prison, and that just about sums up their approach to regulating finance. Of course they got the ratings wrong in the crisis (giving top ratings to bankers toxic CDSs), but that isn't the point - it just proves the politics of it. Most 'economists' are paid to get it wrong in the 'right way' for the ruling class, they are perhaps one of the last academic professions to still be in this backward condition of anti-science.

Sunday, March 22, 2009

Oh What a Lovely Crisis

by Gary Tedman

Today there is a problem, a spectre isn't haunting Europe, instead a vacuum has enveloped it. This vacuum is the absence of leadership in the face of the worst world capitalist crisis in economics since the last worst world capitalist crisis in economics. Our politicians seem unable to respond to it with anything but well worn phrases and old excuses. Fat cat capitalists (Goodwin, AIG executives) make off with huge bonuses for taking their institutions into the most colossal debts in corporate history, while politicians who can put 'enemy combatants' into an offshore prison and torture them with impunity, claim they are powerless to stop these businessmen 'for legal reasons' stuffing their filched taxpayers wealth offshore (as they are wont to do).

Things don't add up even superficially anymore, and it is becoming obvious to the masses with each passing minute that they don't, but the politicians still repeat the same platitudes as solutions: they will have new regulations (but tomorrow), they will tightly control (but at arms length), they will stimulate fiscally (but only the rich who don't need it), they will get lending going again (even while they blame debt for the problem), they will… etc, etc.

We now live 'in interesting times', and it is indeed a curse if this is anything to go by. And yet it also seems, in these times, to be a strange fact that even the ruling class don't understand why there isn't more protest, why the obvious anger hasn't turned out onto the streets as an, at least cathartic, outburst of anguish, they are a little mystified, pensive, subdued.

But the people want a real solution and they can see there is nobody to turn to, so homogeneous and bland has the political landscape become in modern advanced capitalist societies that authentic opposition is invisible, and especially so to its press, which has got into the habit of turning a blind eye to protest and real political innovation so much that it no longer knows how to 'write it up'.

Latterly they are trying, because they have to, for there have indeed been some real protests that have led to changes of government, Iceland and Latvia for instance, but they cannot help but express their own incredulity that they do in fact need to cover such events. Though even these events have been characterized by a lack of conviction in the solutions they have proposed or that have been offered to them. The people sense they are not real solutions, just stop-gaps and the prolonging of an illusion that governments know what they are doing.

They do not know. These governments and administrations have prided themselves for a long history on not knowing about how the economy actually works and on not 'commanding' it. The 'command economies' are always bad, the 'free' economies are always good, they have always said. Now the 'free' economies have gone bad it is still the fault of the 'command' economies, whose acolytes have conspired to cause the demise of this great free system by interfering in its freedom with stupid and unnecessary rules and regulations, and they look back all misty eyed at a time when the free market was truly free, which never existed because a market is, of course, a system of regulations; yet they persist with the myth for reasons of their own sanity, which is in effect their own necessary insanity: the cause of the global problem must be anything but the untrammelled profit motive, why? because they are this motive personified, or at least its visible expression. Their fundamental idea of a 'free market' is being able to take by violence, the rules are meant for the victims.

What's going to happen? There may be a recovery; there may be a long depression. Pretty graphs are charted showing next year's growth, they seem to be based on wishful thinking, not even the usual wishful thinking of the usual statistics of what people think and wish, but ideas drawn from pure thin air. The graphs go down in a curve below the line, but in the next year they magically appear above the line again. Suddenly the fiscal stimuli must have worked, the newly unemployed are invited to think, and there will be jobs again galore and credit again galore and all of this nightmare will be remembered as just that, simply a nightmare, and thus unreal; the slow to be installed regulations can then be ditched, the arms length policy can gain strength (or weakness!), the fraudsters and credit swindlers can start up again quietly, and the governments can get back to what they do best, providing a more believable illusion of leadership over it all. They wish.

Monday, March 2, 2009

Nationalization, Socialism, and the U.S. Banks

By Jim Genova

Associate Professor of History

The Ohio State University-Marion



In the midst of the unfolding global economic crisis politicians, pundits, and bankers have engaged in much hyperbolic discussion about the prospect that major banks in the U.S. may be “nationalized.” On 27 February the U.S. Treasury Department announced that it was converting its “preferred shares” in Citibank into “common shares” giving it a 36% ownership in one of the world’s largest financial institutions. This and other actions taken on the part of the Federal Reserve and U.S. Treasury Department since the crisis began to accelerate last Autumn has led hardened neo-liberal ideologues to exclaim that this is “creeping socialism.” The proclamations of many anchors across the business channels, Conservatives gathered in Washington on 28 February, and Republicans in Congress during the debate over the stimulus bill have elevated to the level of mainstream discourse a conversation over the meaning of the terms “nationalization” and “socialism,” even if the purpose of such right-wing defenders of unbridled global capitalism is to induce ideological confusion and a sense of panic.


On 25 February, members of the House Financial Services Committee asked Fed Chairman Ben Bernanke to explain what he understood to be the definition of “nationalization.” In response, he said it is when “the government ‘seizes’ a company, ‘zeroes out the shareholders and begins to manage and run the bank.” He reassured the anxious Congressmen that “we don’t plan anything like that.”[1] Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner seconded Bernanke’s comments, describing nationalization as “the wrong strategy for the country and I don’t think it’s a necessary strategy.”[2] Sen. Charles Schumer, member of the Senate Banking Committee, also tried to reassure a nervous investor class stating that a “federal takeover of the banks should be avoided at all costs. No one intends, ever, to have the government running these banks or insurance companies for a long period of time.” His goal, somewhat more ambitious than that proposed by either Bernanke or Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner, is to have the government “come in, clean them out, take out the bad assets, put in new management.”[3] Despite such reassurances from those at the center of power, howls from the right and from brokers on the floor of the New York Stock Exchange and Chicago Mercantile Exchange continue to charge that the U.S. beginning under the Bush Administration and continuing at an accelerated pace is heading down the road to “socialism.”



None of the half-measures, abrupt shifts in policy, or tenuous interventions in the financial sector over the past year at least (Bear Stearns went under on 17 March 2008) have been effective at stemming the ever deepening global financial crisis. Banks continue to fail, large monopolistic financial institutions are reeling around the world, and the global economy is spiraling into perhaps its worst crisis ever. Events, as the recent contorted interventions to rescue Citibank have shown, are forcing the leaders of U.S. capitalism to make very difficult and, to them, unpalatable decisions. Neither former Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson (a supposed expert on the Great Depression of the 1930s) nor current Treasury head Tim Geithner (Governor of the New York Fed when Lehman Brothers went down in September 2008) appear to have to will to carry off what is historically necessary – the outright seizure of the major financial institutions of this country. This should not surprise us as they are “true believers” in the neo-liberal capitalist world order. For them, the current crisis is perplexing since it should not be happening at all. At the very least, the market should have shown the way out by now. This led former Fed Chairman Alan Greenspan to recently acknowledge before Congress that the theory to which he (along with Paulson, Bernanke, and Geithner) ascribed was “deeply flawed.” No such statement of contrition has as of yet come forth from Bernanke and Geithner.


Ultimately, many analysts believe that the U.S. government will have no choice but to nationalize some of the largest financial firms, including Citibank, Bank of America, and some large regional banks.[4] Nobel Laureate Joseph Stiglitz recently echoed calls from leading economists Nouriel Roubini and Nassim Taleb to nationalize the U.S. banks telling German television network Deutsche Welle “the banks have failed. Nationalization is the only answer.”[5] Stiglitz has much experience at the center of global finance having served as a member of President Clinton’s Council of Economic Advisors (1993-1997) and as Chief Economist and Senior Vice President of the World Bank (1997-2000). During those terms he witnessed the LTCM and East Asia currency crises (1996-1998) that some economists like Paul Krugman warned was a prelude to a global economic depression.[6] What has happened in the meantime is that trillions of dollars have been thrown down the bottomless chute of fundamentally insolvent institutions beyond hope of rescue.[7] Moreover, for all of this public money used to prop up badly run speculative private institutions not once has the government forced the management to resign (the recent move at Citibank showed the first signs of the Treasury making demands about the composition of corporate boards) nor has it called for any “claw back” provisions of the bonuses and extravagant pay for executives who ran their enterprises into the ground. Instead, public wealth is being transferred on a rapidly moving conveyor belt into the hands of unscrupulous and failed bankers. This is becoming one of the greatest thefts in world history. As Stiglitz told Deutche Welle, “separation of ownership from control is a recipe for disaster.”[8]


What is called for is an emergency solution not unlike that confronting Russia in the summer of 1917 when the Bolshevik leader V. I. Lenin wrote The Threatening Catastrophe and How to Fight It. In that pamphlet, Lenin described an unfolding crisis where the wheels of the Russian economy were grinding to a halt. Banks had ceased lending, railroads were shutting down, food supplies were dwindling, and unemployment was mounting. Lenin also noted that there was much public discussion among politicians and leaders of industry that something dramatic had to be done to salvage the situation. “Everybody says that. Everybody recognizes that. Everybody has agreed to that. And nothing is being done.”[9] Even more recently, Sweden’s experience in the early 1990s has been held up as analogous to the broad parameters of the current U.S. situation. There a housing boom in the late 1980s led to speculation on mortgage-backed debt that eventually ended badly leading to the government taking effective control of the largest banks. Sweden then forced the banks to create two institutions under one roof – a good bank and a bad bank. All of the “toxic assets” were concentrated in the bad banks, which gradually (over four years) sold them off.[10] The problem with using Sweden’s banking crisis as a model for understanding our own is that not only is Sweden’s economy a fraction of the size of that in the U.S. but its institutions are not at the epicenter of the global capitalist system. Institutions like CitiGroup, Morgan Stanley, Bank of America, JP Morgan Chase, Goldman Sachs, and others are global monopolistic enterprises with branches, partners, and subsidiaries throughout the world. Moreover, they are the vehicles through which the leaders of U.S. government pass on their way to political power. Consequently, there is an incestuous relationship between the “too big to fail” banks and the officials in charge of their oversight. There was nothing analogous in Sweden’s case. Finally, the U.S. crisis does not stem entirely from a decline in home prices (the much vaunted bursting of the housing bubble). Rather, for decades there has been a mounting structural weakness in the U.S. economy and by extension global capitalism. That is the overwhelming dependence for the survival and expansion of the system on debt of all kinds – credit cards, mortgages, auto financing, leveraged stock trading, and greatly expanded issuing of public debt of many varieties. Since the early 1970s there has been a widening disconnect between the real wages of workers in the industrialized world and the accumulation of public and private debt.[11]


We are at a crossroads in the current crisis. Every leading politician, pundit, and financial analyst acknowledges that the situation requires urgent action. On financial, ethical, and political grounds it is imperative that the U.S. government nationalize the major financial institutions, place them under federal control, unify them into one central bank to provide for more efficient management, and completely dispatch the executive management of those firms that have been seized. Only through that device can the process of daily pumping billions upon billions into dead institutions be stopped. Only through such bold moves can the government gain the leverage it needs to control the credit markets, make interest rates meaningful, and aggressively restructure mortgages. Only through the decisive action of seizing, controlling, and re-directing the functioning of the banks to serve the immediate and long-term needs of the people can the rate of decline be slowed and some stability be restored to the financial sector of the economy.[12]


This should not be confused with socialism. Such labeling is an effort on the part of those ideologues still committed to the failed neo-liberal policies of the Washington Consensus dating to Reagan and Thatcher years of the early 1980s to derail any meaningful assistance to those workers, farmers, and middle class people who are suffering because of the greed of the capitalist elite. Moreover, it is the same callousness that those practitioners of gung-ho capitalism displayed in guiding IMF and World Bank policies on a path to crippling and impoverishing developing countries around the world through “Structural Adjustment Programs.” Lenin clearly delineated the difference between “state monopoly capitalism” and socialism, but argued that it was imperative in the period of impending catastrophe that responsible officials of any government take the decisive measures necessary to save people from mass unemployment, famine, and deep social dislocation. That the global economic crisis portends widespread political upheaval has been attested to by analysts and researchers who work in Africa, Asia, and Latin America.[13] In describing the 1917 crisis in Russia, Lenin wrote that nationalizing the banks would improve “the accessibility and the easy terms of credit, particularly for small owners [and] for the peasantry.” Further, the state would “be in a position to survey all the main monetary operations without concealing them, then to control them, then to regulate economic life, and finally to obtain millions and billions for large state operations.”[14] This addresses many of the most salient aspects of the crisis in the financial sector: transparency, accountability, assistance for those who actually need it, saving funds that will be needed for further stimulus, and it resolves the fatal disconnect Stiglitz identified in the current approach between having ownership without control. Beyond the current crisis, though, since the capitalist ideologues have raised the specter of socialism in the U.S., it is an opportunity for progressive forces to intervene in the public conversation and offer a real understanding of what socialism is while also highlighting the ultimate flaws of capitalism that can never be overcome or resolved from inside the system. This is an historic opportunity for the government to act on behalf of the people to mitigate the effects of a dying system and for progressives to make the case for socialism. The fate of millions of people around the world depends on the abilities of both to do what is historically necessary.




[1] Craig Torres and Bradley Keoun, “Bernanke Rejects ‘Anything Like’ Bank Nationalization,” Bloomberg.com 25 February 2009.
[2] Robert Schmidt, “Geithner Calls Nationalizing Banks ‘Wrong Strategy’ for Economy,” Bloomberg.com, 25 February 2009.
[3] Torres and Keoun, “Bernanke Rejects ‘Anything Like’ Bank Nationalization.”
[4] Matthew Richardson, “The Case for and against Bank Nationalisation,” VoxEU.org, 26 February 2009.
[5] Michael Knigge, “Stiglitz: Nationalized Banks are ‘Only Answer’,” Deutche Welle, 16 February 2009. Reprinted in the People’s Weekly World.
[6] Paul Krugman, The Return of Depression Economics and The Crisis of 2008, New York: W. W. Norton, 2008.
[7] On 27 February Bloomberg Financial Group provided an assessment of the entire contribution made by the Federal Reserve and U.S. Treasury Department to prop up the financial system since the beginnings of the crisis in August 2007. Its conclusion was that to date $11.6 trillion has been either spent or taken on as liabilities in the process. This includes cash injections into the trading markets, the TARP and other emergency programs, loans to banks facilitating their takeover of other even worse off financial institutions, the seizures of AIG, Freddie Mac, and Fannie Mae, loans to the Auto Industry, and the expansion of the Fed’s balance sheet to facilitate the commercial paper market that seized in September and October 2008.
[8] Knigge, “Stiglitz: Nationalized Banks are ‘Only Answer.””
[9] V. I. Lenin, The Threatening Catastrophe and How to Fight It, New York; International Publishers, 1932, p. 5. The essay was written 23-27 September 1917.
[10] Edward Harrison, “Did Sweden Really Nationalize Its Banks?” online blog post, 25 February 2009.
[11] Federal Reserve Table 100.B Data for 1945-2005, published by AutoDogmatic.com.
[12] Binyamin Appelbaum, “What Is Nationalization? Depends Who You Ask,” Washington Post, 25 February 2009. See also Robert Griffiths, “Why Nationalization Isn’t Socialism,” Politicalaffairs.net, 3 November 2008, reproduced from the Morning Star.
[13] Nelson D. Schwartz, “Job Losses Pose a threat to Stability Worldwide,” New York Times, 15 February 2009.
[14] Lenin, The Threatening Catastrophe and How to Fight It. Italics in the original.