Marxism, the Taliban and Plato

Marxism, the Taliban and Plato
Thomas Riggins

Recently Simon Blackburn, the well known British philosopher, reviewed "Knowing Right from Wrong," the new book by Kieran Setiya, in the TLS ["Taliban and Plato" TLS July 19, 2013]. The essay deals with Setiya's attempt to defend ethical realism (objective moral knowledge is possible) which Blackburn rejects in favor of ethical pragmatism (useful moral knowledge is possible). I think neither of these positions are tenable and the best way to approach ethics is from a Marxist perspective.

Blackburn begins with Plato's position in the Republic: the Good can only be understood by those intellectually elite philosophers who rule Plato's ideal state in the interests of the people. After their basic studies and military training the elite undergo ten years of mathematical training followed by five years of philosophy and begin to take part in ruling at the age of 55. This puts ethical knowledge out of the way of most people who must take on faith that their rulers have actually attained such knowledge.

We need something a little more accessible, Blackburn thinks, and the virtue ethics of Aristotle based on common sense, empiricism and "scientific" method provided a practical alternative to Plato's views in the Republic (the Republic does not exhaust Plato's views on this subject.)

 Setiya"s book deals with, and Blackburn quotes him, "a tension between two things: the need to explain our reliability so that the truth of our beliefs can be no accident, and the need to leave room for communities that are not at all reliable."

Blackburn tells us that for Plato knowledge was different from true belief-- you might have a true belief that you picked up by accident, or a  guess, but this does not qualify as knowledge. Plato demands a "logos" for knowledge claims, "meaning," Blackburn says, "something like reason, justification or some kind of method -- and reliability seems a good yardstick for soundness."  But how do we test for "reliability?"

Here is the problem. Blackburn, for example, believes (1) in equal educational opportunities for men and women and (2) this is a reliable belief (i.e., true) based on  "cultural and historical forces" operant on Blackburn. Using the Afghan Taliban as a foil, Blackburn says they deny (1) and therefore (2) as well. "We need," he says, "a view from outside: an independent stamp of the reliability of our progress."

Where to find it? An appeal to Reason won't work. Just to claim we are "reasonable" and the Taliban are not is not  an independent outside view. What move does Setiya make that could uphold Blackburn's belief as reliable? He makes an appeal to "human nature." Setiya says "how human beings by nature live is not the measure of how they should." He uses the term "life form" for "human nature" and thinks, according to Blackburn, "in a proper environment, free from neglect or hunger or abuse" their true life form will emerge "and then they naturally gravitate towards the moral truth." This implies an objective moral truth out there (or in us) waiting for the proper environment.

Blackburn seems to contradict himself by saying this view is not meant to be "universally true" but more like natural history statements such as "dogs bark" or "finches lay eggs in the spring" which certainly seem to be, in the proper environment, "universally true."  Blackburn says: "So, the idea is that as a species, in the kind of circumstance in which we naturally live, we tend to believe what is morally and ethically true."  But this is just asserting the. conclusion, there is no argument here. The Taliban could say "Fine, where we naturally live women should not have equal educational opportunities as they have different roles to play in society and this is morally and ethically true."  Blackburn's belief is not upheld. But, I think the Taliban would reject the relativism implied here and think their attitude toward education is universally true.

Blackburn sees problems with Setiya's position. When we look at history and other societies we see all sorts of, to us, strange and wicked goings on. Bertrand Russell put it this way: "When we study in the works of anthropologists the moral precepts  which men have considered binding in different times and places we find the most bewildering variety" [Styles in Ethics, 1924].

 Blackburn says this leads to "a contemporary form of moral skepticism, which argues that a capacity for ethical truth would have given no selective advantage to anybody, so that it would be a miracle if it came to predominate  as a trait of our species." But this is nonsense as it assumes that the skeptic knows what ethical truth is and that nobody ever got a selective advantage from this knowledge-- neither of which the skeptic is in a reliable position to claim to know.

Setiya seeks to avoid moral skepticism, according to Blackburn, by adopting a position he calls NATURAL CONSTRUCTIVISM and defines as follows: "for a trait to be a virtue is for creatures of one's life form to believe that it is a virtue." This will not do at all. The Taliban, creature's of our life form, believe  it to be a virtue to deny equal educational opportunities to females (they may even feel it a virtue to throw acid in young girl's faces or shoot them for going to school) but really, should we think it is a virtue just because they have these beliefs. Mind you, Setiya wants to avoid both skepticism and RELATIVISM.

Well, we don't think it a virtue because our values differ from those of the Taliban and we share the same life form ( we are the same species with the same nature). But this begs the question. Blackburn has accepted female education due to the operant conditions of his culture and the Taliban reject it due to theirs. How do we escape relativism?

Setiya seems to be aware that you can't just define virtue the way he has done but he does so because he has "a certain faith in human nature." This implies the Taliban are wrong because they don't live the way our species (life form) is naturally programmed to live so, unlike us, they have not arrived at the proper ethical and moral conclusions. If you didn't already agree with the conclusion, you would never accept this argument-- if argument it be rather than just assertion.

Setiya warns us, says Blackwell, that his argument is the only way to defend moral knowledge or to have justified moral beliefs. It is "natural constructivism" based on reason and a universal human nature or, as Blackwell puts it, we may end up with "a soggy relativism" with one "truth" for the Taliban and another for those of us sharing Blackburn's operant conditioning.

Blackburn doesn't like this outcome, it "seems intolerable." He wants some justification for female educational equality, and it seems, for also thinking ill of the Taliban. If Setiya's moral realism won't work (i.e., no objective rules) he recommends a form of moral pragmatism. Blackburn's morals are more suited to our culture and useful and we (readers of the TLS and members of the culture that produced it) would shudder to live under the Taliban system-- so we definitely are going to favor female educational equality and, in fact, maintain it is the morally right thing.

Blackburn is modest, though, and admits there is a slight possibility he is wrong about this-- but this is only a theoretical possibility.  He even admits he doesn't have "the dialectical weaponry with which to topple the Taliban" and that he remains under the morality that the operant conditioning of his culture has created. He has hopes that the Taliban will change because their culture is "not hermetically sealed from ours" (the expected change appears to be one way), there will be "dissident voices"  and "stirrings of modernity" and half the population "has the burning desire to change." Cultural conditioning doesn't seem to take place among Taliban females. Can it be possible that Pashtun women are completely alienated from their men folk and none of them accept the traditional culture of their people?

Blackburn tells us the difference between realism ad pragmatism is that realism is interested in metaphysical problems regarding the nature of the "truths" of morality and seeks reliable claims as to this nature, while pragmatism does not believe this to be possible and there is no "foundation outside our ethics for our ethics to stand on."

What would a Marxist position be on these issues. I would propose a synthesis of ethical realism (there are objective ethical principals that should be followed if you want to create a particular type of society just as there are mathematical and physical laws you must follow if you want to fly to the Moon) and these laws also have a pragmatic dimension. Marxists do not believe in abstract metaphysical entities not rooted in the material world. They do not look for universal ethical principles applicable to all times and places.

The main motivating force of Marxism is to empower the working class, abolish capitalist exploitation of working people by the appropriation of the surplus value they create, and establish socialism and a world without one class or group of humans living off the exploitation of another. So there is a foundation to our ethics outside of our ethics which it can stand on. Whatever actions objectively further the interests of working people, which are determined by an objective scientific analysis of the social, political and economic forces in a given society, are morally and ethically correct. This is a materialist ethics based on forces objectively at work in a given historical period and has nothing to do with an idea such as "to be a virtue it is only necessary for members of your life form to believe it is a virtue" or a virtue is what readers of the TLS would think useful.

The class struggle is an objective fact of life and the sociological and economic laws that produce it are independent of the subjective desires or will of the people involved. Understanding these laws, such as the law of value, is possible and actions can be initiated in the real world to overcome this struggle and end it and the ethics and morals involved in this struggle rest on an objective materialist foundation independent of the human subject. This view point I think is much more realistic than that of either Setiya or Blackburn.

Stop and Frisk: Mayor Boomberg vs Minority Youth

Stop and Frisk: What Mayor Bloomberg Really Thinks About Minority Youth

Thomas Riggins

New York City Mayor Bloomberg, speaking before last Sunday's gay rights parade, tried to defend his position supporting the NYPD's massive stop and frisk program directed against minority (mostly Black and Hispanic) youth. His remarks were so out of line that the New York Times wrote an editorial (7-2-13) criticizing his "loopy logic" and U.S. Representative Hakeem Jeffries (Dem. N.Y.) was moved to say his comments "were sad, disrespectful, hurtful, and quite unfortunate."

The mayor dismissed the concerns of the minority community that they were being disproportionately stopped by the police and were, in fact, being harassed by the department. The fact that only 9% of the stops in 2012 involved whites was not seen by the mayor as in any way evidence that the minority rate was overly disproportionate. In fact he thought too many white people were being stopped and they were the ones who should be complaining about disproportionate treatment. His reason was that only 7% of the 2012 murder rate was due to white people (this was the only crime statistic he gave).

It may come as a surprise to many New Yorkers that the problem with the NYPD is that it is harassing white people not minorities, but that is Bloomberg's position. He is reported as maintaining (Wall Street Journal, 7-1-13) that "The numbers are the numbers, and the numbers clearly show that the stops are generally proportionate with suspects' descriptions and for years now critics have been trying to argue that minorities are stopped disproportionately." The numbers show not enough minority youth are being stopped and too many white folks are. "The numbers don't lie," the mayor said.

Well, if that is the problem in New York-- harassment of white youth by the police, I don't understand what the mayor has against a federally appointed monitor to make sure the NYPD is not violating people's constitutional rights. The federal monitor would at least clear the mayor and his police commissioner Ray Kelly of discriminating against minority youth and thus undermine the charges of racism in high places.

But the mayor also thinks a disproportionate amount of crime is due to minority youth so if they were disproportionately stopped they would really be proportionally stopped because they would be being stopped proportionally to the percentage of crimes they were responsible for and not in proportion to their population with respect to the disproportionately stopped white people. I hope this is clear. It means whatever the mayor does will turn out to be ok, except for being unfair to white folk.

Here is the mayor's view on minority youth. He said the politicians running for mayor would rather try and get votes  "than help us get out of this terrible situation where a disproportionate percentage of the crime is committed by a group of young kids that just don't have any future."

And why don't minority youth have any future? Is it because of the mismanaged educational system where the mayor would rather fight with the teachers than work with them to improve educational opportunities? Is it the lack of adequate after school programs and summer jobs, and employment training opportunities? Is due to slum housing and rent gouging of the poor? Could the NYPD and the mayor by targeting millions of minority youth as potential criminals because they "have no future" except crime be sending that very message to them-- no future for you!

I think it pretty clear that the mayor and his police commissioner have written off the majority of Black and Hispanic youth and are subjecting them to an unjustified program of stop and frisk harassment. The city council has just passed a bill creating an independent inspector general to check on abuse of power by the police. The mayor says he will veto it. The mayor should ask himself-- if the NYPD isn't doing anything wrong, what's the worry?

Who Turned the Lights Off? Jonathan Israel's Take on Pagden's "The Enlightenment"

Thomas Riggins

The world today is in the grips of the irrational and anarchic system of global capitalism dominated by the United States and characterized by international economic and political disorders, wars, poverty and environmental destruction.
In order to arrive at solutions to the problems facing humanity we will have to devise methods to overcome the capitalist system of irrationality and replace it by a rational international order based on the principles of democratic control rooted in a rational approach to solving the problems of war, economic inequality and environmental degradation by means of reason (logic and science).

It is important that those concerned with trying to bring about a transition from the unworkable present to a better future, which is not dominated by predatory capitalist super powers and their hanger ons, have a clear understanding of the most important historical movement before Marxism that attempted to bring about a better world and the lessons it has for us today.

This movement is known to history as the Enlightenment  which dates, more or less, from the middle of the 17th Century (one could almost say from the writings of Spinoza and his heirs) until the mid-19th century when nationalism and class warfare turned the ruling elites against the Enlightenment's values of  social justice, equality, and human rights and turned off the lights, or tied to, which had illuminated and revealed the problems facing humanity and their solutions. Lights that were reignited by the world socialist movement initiated by the works of Marx and Engels.

Today these values are again on the agenda, at least as far as lip service is concerned. This article will review the analysis of Anthony Pagden's new book, "The Enlightenment And why it still matters," by Jonathan Israel published in the TLS of June 21, 2013 ("How the light came in").

Israel has some initial good things to say about this book but then he mounts some very strong objections to its view of the Enlightenment-- so strong that I don't think this book would be a good introduction to the importance of this historical period.

Israel begins by telling us the Enlightenment is much more significant in the creation of "modernity" than the Renaissance or the Reformation (as important as these other movements were).  Pagden's book is, he says,  "one of the better surveys of the Enlightenment." From what follows the others must really be bad! Israel gives the following negative evaluations.

First, he finds the book's views on the beginnings of the Enlightenment and its "overall interpretation" to be "unsatisfactory." Who would begin to study a 436 page history book based on this evaluation? What is the reason for this negative view? The book is too anglo-centric with respect to the origins of the early Enlightenment (late 17th to mid 18th centuries.) The stress is on Hobbes, Locke, Shaftesbury, Hutcheson "and other British and Irish thinkers." In reality these figures were of minor importance compared to the Continental writers such as Leibniz, Wolff, Bayle, Thomasius and Spinoza and were rarely cited by them.

In fact, the really important early writings were in French (or Latin) but from a Dutch "milieu." It was Holland, not England that in 1700 or so "counted internationally as the world's foremost model of a tolerant, prosperous republican ethnic  and religious melting pot." Locke, for all his British acclaim, "was of practically no significance" to such major radical Enlightenment figures as Pierre Bayle  and Denis Diderot. In fact, as Israel points out elsewhere, the most important thinker for the entire Enlightenment period, was Spinoza. One might also conclude that in the whole era between Descartes and Marx the two most outstanding philosophical giants were Spinoza and Hegel.

Israel considers it a "serious omission" that Pagden practically ignores the major role of the Dutch Republic in favor of Britain as the inspiration to Enlightenment thinkers favoring political reform and a republican form of government. The first big struggle for democracy in the modern world was not the American Revolution of 1776-83 (it was "not fully democratic") but the Patriottenbeweging (Patriot movement) of 1780-87 in Holland which was referred to at least as often by the Enlighteners leading the French Revolution as were the English revolutions of the previous century.

The book's greatest flaw is the failure to identify properly those Enlightenment figures responsible for the creation of "democratic modernity" which Pagden thinks was a principal achievement of the Enlightenment. Instead it concentrates on the traditional standbys of Anglo-American scholarship-- Locke, Montesquieu, Hume, Voltaire and Adam Smith-- all of whom were "moderates" [Hume was an outright racist]  "who made no particular contributions to furthering racial and gender equality, anti-colonialism, full freedom of thought and religion, press freedom, universal secular education or general emancipation."  They were the least revolutionary with respect to changing the status quo in a radical manner and so have become the most well known and taught in anglophone countries.

Besides a greatest flaw (Israel says "principal weakness") there is a "key vulnerability" as well. This reveals itself in the last chapter on the role of the Enlightenment in the French Revolution. Pagden sees only two major phases in the Revolution: the first Enlightenment phase that reined in the monarchy in June 1789 and under the rule of the National Assembly created the constitution of 1791 and the second the Terror under Robespierre which, as Israel agrees, "denied the Enlightenment's core values" [a libel I think against Robespierre and the Jacobins.]

There were, however, not two-- but three revolutions according to Israel-- there was a middle period between 1791 (the date of the "monarchist constitution" put forth by moderates led by the marquis de Lafayette and other liberal monarchists, and the Terror. Pagden ignores this "tragic middle phase" led by the kind of radical philosophes favored by Israel and better known as the Girondins as opposed to Robespierre's Jacobins.

Israel says the Girondins were radical democrats who wanted universal male suffrage, were opposed to slavery, and favored the rights of women, as well as universal toleration and an unrestricted free press. Israel also says Robespierre was completely opposed to these radical democrats  and that after the Jacobins seized power in 1793 they instituted the Terror and went "all out to suppress the Enlightenment in government, social theory and education…."

This may be a bit unfair to Robespierre and the Jacobins who thought the Revolution itself was on the verge being overthrown by reactionary counter-revolutionary forces and that Girondin polices were not forceful enough to prevent this. The Jacobins seized power not because they rejected Enlightenment ideas but because they thought a temporary people's democratic dictatorship was required to save the Revolution and that the Girondins, by opposing them, had placed themselves on the side of counter-revolution whatever their subjective attitudes toward the Revolution might  have been.

The Girondins did not trust the revolutionary masses and were against direct democracy and in favor of indirect representative democracy whereby the people's elected representatives (educated and cultured folks such as the Girondins) would represent the real interests of the people who were too ignorant and uneducated to properly represent themselves. The Jacobins came to power by means of a direct democratic appeal to the revolutionary masses to save the Revolution and whatever the ultimate evaluation of the Terror may turn out to be, many, if not most, historians credit the Jacobins and Robespierre with reversing the counter-revolution and preventing the collapse of the Republic.

Under the Jacobins Feudalism was abolished in France and a new democratic constitution was enacted in 1793. This Jacobin constitution was ratified by a vote which was undertaken with universal male suffrage and it was based on the 1789 "Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen" and it supported popular sovereignty and instituted rights for the French people such as the right of association, the right to work, to public welfare, to public education, the right to rebel against any government violation of the people's rights. The Jacobins  also abolished slavery throughout the territories governed by France.

This constitution shows that the values of the Enlightenment were not foreign to Robespierre and the Jacobins. However, despite coming up with this great progressive constitution supported by the revolutionary masses, the Jacobins also decided to postpone implementing it until the counter- revolutionary threat was over and the Terror was no longer necessary. The Jacobins were overthrown in 1794 by a milder counter-revolution than the one they had saved the country from so their constitution was never really implemented and was replaced by a less revolutionary one in 1795 which was nevertheless influenced by it.

Israel only half agrees with Pagden's assertion that the Enlightenment was a reform movement not a revolutionary one that, in his words, it 'had , in fact, always been identified with reform rather than revolution." Pagden misses the point that there were really TWO Enlightenments-- a moderate conservative and/or reformist one [e.g., Locke, Hume, Adam Smith, Burke, Ferguson, Gibbon-- just to mention anglophones], and a radical one [Bentham, John Jebb, Price, Thomas Paine, Priestley, Mary Wollenstonecraft, Helen Maria Williams, Godwin, Barlow, Jefferson, Elihu Palmer]. This same split could also be found on the Continent where such "super" radicals as Diderot, d'Holbach, Helvétius, Lessing for example, faced off against moderates such as Voltaire, Leibniz, Wolff, and later Kant and their followers. The counter Enlightenment attacked both these Enlightenments sometimes confusing them as just one movement-- which many counter Enlightenment intellectuals continue to do in our own day.

The "fundamental idea" of the radical Enlightenment was, according to Israel, "that the true human moral order is based not on divine revelation or intervention but exclusively on social utility, especially equality and secularism." Moderate figures fudge these distinctions and reactionary counter Enlightenment thinkers (if thinkers they be) deny them completely.

The great rift created by the radical Enlightenment between those who appeal basically to reason (logic and science) to solve our problems and those who want to "balance" reason "with religion, existing institutions, the prevailing social order and tradition" still exists today  and is at the heart of the political and social struggles that will shape the 21st century.

European Social Contract Betrayed

European Social Democracy sells out its electorate.

By Thomas Riggins

By supporting austerity measures the mainstream center left parties have abandoned the very people, working and middle class supporters, they are supposed to represent.

Keywords:

European Social Contract Betrayed
Thomas Riggins

The austerity regimes being imposed on the European working class and some elements of the middle classes by the the IMF and the central banks of several large European countries, especially Germany have resulted in millions of working people rejecting the traditional mainstream capitalist parties and voting for parties labeled by the mainstream media as "fringe." Some of these "fringe" parties are so large that they determine the outcome of national elections (the Five Star Movement in Italy for example) and pose a serious threat to "business as usual" in the social democratic movement.

It should be noted that after World War II and the collapse of German and Italian fascism, there was panic in the West European and American business circles that Communist Parties would be swept into power either by uprisings or elections. To fight this threat concessions were made to the working people in the form of social welfare programs based on socialist principles but trimmed down so as not to threaten the power and control of the international banking system led by the United States.

The United States basically financed the reconstruction of Western Europe and European capitalism and both the traditional conservative and right wing elements as well as the social democratic and center-left elements teamed up to back social programs designed to lessen the appeal of the demands of the Communist and Workers movements. This system worked fairly well until the breakdown of the capitalist system starting with the 2007 housing bubble and subsequent banking crisis. What has happened to the working people in Europe since the outbreak of the crisis is described by David C. Unger in his recent New York Times article ("Europe's Social Contract Lying in Pieces"-NYT online 6-9-13).

Unger in his article laments that this "social contract" has been abandoned by the European center left parties and as a result "democracy's best advertisement to the Communist East" had been "undermined … in pursuit of a perverse economic dogma." The point of course is that all the social gains granted by the capitalists to the West European working people were begrudgingly conceded out of fear of the appeal of the Soviet Union and the world communist movement.

With the undermining and collapse of the Soviet Union and East European socialism, big capital no longer saw the need to coddle the working class and has reverted true to form to reimpose a regime of extreme economic exploitation in order to maximize its profits. Austerity is simply the redirection of social wealth from programs, such as health care, housing, unemployment, pensions, etc.,) into the coffers of the bankers and financial speculators where it rightfully belongs under the capitalist system ("a perverse economic dogma" which I take, unlike Unger, to be capitalism itself.)

What have the social democrats done-- especially the Democrats in Italy the Socialist Party in France, the Spanish socialists, Pasok (the Greek socialist party) and others? They have abandoned the very people they are supposed to represent--the working people and have backed and voted for policies that will bring about "many more years of cuts in social spending" and they are "increasingly out of touch with the desperate situation of young people." This is why millions of voters have deserted these parties for so-called "fringe" groups.

What are the consequences of this social democratic betrayal? This is how Unger
describes the scene in Mediterranean Europe: "You see shuttered groceries and clothing shops, abandoned restaurants, idled factories and half-built housing developments overgrown with weeds. Newspapers carry heartbreaking stories of families evicted from modest apartments, people losing their jobs and then their health benefits, young and not-so-young women turning to prostitution to make ends meet, even suicides by self-immolation." This is the modern day equivalent of the heartless inhumane capitalism described by Marx in Das Kapital.

Unger points out that the economic power of Germany is so great it probably could have dictated the present regime of austerity without the cooperation and even against the hostility of social democracy. Today's Germany has attained what it failed to achieve in two world wars, economic (and hence political) dominance of Europe. The tragedy of social democracy is that it collaborated in the destruction of its own electorate instead of fighting, even if a losing battle, to protect it. That betrayal did not go unnoticed.

As the European workers begin to fight back, as the communist and workers parties begin to gain in strength other social forces are also rapidly growing. Forces from the Dark Side are also beginning to proliferate such as the neo-Nazi Golden Dawn in Greece ("Greece for the Greeks"), the United Kingdom Independence Party (right-wing Eurosceptic libertarians), the National Front (a "whites only" party in the UK). The Union pour un Mouvement Populaire (UMP) and the UK Conservative Party should also take notice as they too are losing members to the "fringe." Unger says Germany too should not be too confident. Their present economic dominance may evaporate if the rest of Europe dissolves into political and social chaos due to the on going capitalist crisis. An ultra-right movement in Germany may become ascendent. We wouldn't want that to happen again. 

Democratic Sex

By Gary Tedman

If, in fact, it is possible for there to be homosexual men, a sexual male who is attracted to a male, which it obviously is, then the possibility must also be accepted that a male can be gendered as a female, yet still be attracted to a female. If gender is constructed, then there can be no exclusions to the construction (considered ideally). This means that the female gendered as a man who loves women may also be gendered as a man but loves men, so in a sense we have a parallel to the male lesbian, but we have no name for it, perhaps tom-boy is the old label. The tom-boy is not necessarily a woman who does not 'like' men, and likewise the 'camp' man is not necessarily the gay man who is attracted to men. Yet the male lesbian is a character which is usually ruled out by even radical accounts of sexuality. This may indicate the justified suspicion of the 'reformed' male, but it appears to go further than this and be a kind of prohibition or taboo, amongst 'men' and 'women' and 'gays' and 'lesbians'. This fourfold structure in fact appears to make a neat package that tends not to admit other entries, for example bisexuality. Why?

It is perhaps the way in which these interact as false dialectics to shore each other up as differences, in some senses the notion of an original structure 'man and woman' is reconfirmed and recuperated by the alternative gay and lesbian, and the loop is closed. It is closed doubly if it is inverted and the alternative is seen to be the 'straight', as happens sometimes in inverted gender snobbery (that the 'alternative' lifestyle is a massive industry hardly needs proving these days). The feminine male or the male lesbian must be gay, says the male-male, or he is in some senses even more of a pervert in the standard narrative of sex, if he shows those positive/negative virtues/drawbacks of 'femininity'. The male lesbian, let us conjecture, might be no good for war, for he is a coward, obviously, and has no excuse for this, since he 'is a male'. The gay male may go to war proudly, since he may love the 'masculine attributes', likewise the lesbian.

It has famously been said that sex between two people is really an activity between four persons (Freud), but here we seem to have grown eight, two of which are the same, bisexual, the rest: the pair of straights, lesbian and gay, male-lesbian and tom-boy (for want of better names). There are two for bisexual because really one can never be completely balanced, we are always sided, and there is chirality at work in sexual practice, but theoretically they stand for zero. This structure renders sexuality democratic, because every approach to gender performance is taken into account, and so is freed from the illusion which polices subjects within the strict boundaries of the either/or false dialectics of sex: i.e. the notion that the sexes are dialectical opposites with an essential nature, one which may be, then subverted, but only in a prescribed manner that acts to reconfirm the authenticity of the false dialectic, in other words: either side of the two dualities may be the nice or nasty policeman.

Of course, in saying all this, I am aware that in practice the dominating side of the sexuality/gender problem is the 'straight' side, and that still in many ways homosexuality is oppressed as 'deviating' away from the authentic.

In the article Is Monogamy Essential to Democracy? (Salon interview, 24 May 2012) staff writer Tracy Clark Flory sets out the argument against polygamy developed by the psychologist Joseph Henrich, whose expertise was called for during a Canadian Supreme Court's reconsideration of the state ban on plural marriage. In a 64-page affidavit, the professor (from the University of British Columbia) used his areas of expertise — psychology, anthropology and economics — to make obvious the social harm associated with men taking multiple wives. Implicit in his argument was, apart from that it would be wives in this position of multiplicity, an endorsement of monogamy, which, he wrote: "seems to redirect male motivations in ways that generate lower crime rates, greater GDP per capita, and better outcomes for children." His interest, she explained, was not in the individual, emotional experience of sexual and romantic exclusivity, so much as the evolution of cultural norms and how they impact society. The connection is established between monogamy and democracy in the following manner: that it has been argued by historians that monogamy precedes and then goes along with, the emergence of democratic ideals, so that in the named 'Western tradition', the earliest we can trace laws about monogamy is to Athens, when democracy began to be instituted. His argument is that monogamy here is set-up to create equality among citizens so that, essentially, there will be wives available to all Athenian men, rather than having all the rich men take many wives, although (!) men were still allowed to have slave concubines, as long as they were non-Athenian women; he says therefore, that we may think of this as a first effort to try to level the playing field by saying that both the king and the peasant can only have one wife each: the first step toward saying that all men were created equal.

He does discuss, nevertheless possible exceptions to this case: in many small-scale societies, he discloses that there is an institution that appears similar to Western marriage, where people 'pair bond', but, he says, there is unfortunately 'philandering on the side' by both men and women, saying that they will often just cycle to another 'pair bond', it not being uncommon for hunter gatherers to have three, four or five pair bonds in the course of their life while having children from each union. This seems to be put in a negative light for no apparent rational reason, but still: there are these groups in South America where Henrich explains that people believe that the fetus is formed by ejaculations from multiple males, so the kids can have multiple fathers and you improve the survival of your child by getting him or her a second father, so when women first get pregnant, they will seek sexual liaisons with other men because then those men believe they have a fatherly responsibility to the child. What he describes as social norms in this case decide that the husband, the primary father, is not to be upset about this, that it is perfectly allright for the woman to go out and seek these other mates—but, and this is telling, he notes that the 'ethnography suggests' that these 'guys are really grumpy about it' as if they secretly share our more 'natural' Western ideals and taboos, that you have an innate jealous reaction that is stamped down by local social norms.

His democratic argument in favor of outlawing polygamy runs as a result: that polygamy (when men marry multiple wives, here) takes up all the women and creates an underclass of men that have no access to partners, and these men cause trouble: i.e. they commit crimes and 'engage in substance abuse'. And what is more there is also seen to be less equality for women and more strife in the home because women are in short supply, which 'increases male competition', and so 'men use violence against women to control the household'. Also, he goes on (in this, what is becoming an astonishing excuse for what is) if you have one male with lots of wives, there are "all sorts of stepmothers and unrelated adults in the same household as children, and that increases the likelihood of violence". The biggest risk factor, he says, for spouses killing each other is a large age difference, and in polygamous households you inevitably end up with a large age difference between at least some of the spouses.

The one-child policy in China is referred to: which is seen to create the same kind of surplus of men because of the preference for sons and the use of sex-selective abortion, he says: "You can see 18 years after you implement the one-child policy, you get extra men and that predicts extra crime." The same thing is posited as happening in India too. All this is against the rule of economics because "…There is a Stanford economist who argues that when men can't invest in getting another wife, they then invest more in their own production." The theory is that rather than basically saving up in order to get a second wife or a third wife, they invest more in the children of the one wife they have, and in other types of economic production, so marriage here is seen as functioning as a form of social control. This is even figured as a medical fact concerned with hormonal mechanisms: Henrich refers to research that studies men before and after they get married and before and after they have children; the early evidence, he says, suggests that males have two testosterone reductions during those periods, and it is high testosterone levels that lead to a high level of mate-seeking and so 'risk-taking'. He refers to one study that was performed

"…in a polygynous society that found males don’t suffer the same testosterone drop. That makes good sense because if you get married in a polygynous society, you’re still on the mating market. Think of testosterone as a mating hormone: It doesn’t go down because you’re still looking around—or you’re looking less than you would be otherwise, if for no other reason than people are watching and expecting you to not be looking."

This takes us back to the element of social control: one of the apparent keys to understanding marriage is third parties; marriage is not only a contract between two people, because there are all these outside parties with 'expectations' ('rational expectations'?) about how two married people are supposed to 'behave'; failure to live up to that has reputational consequences, and, it seems that there are comparisons to be made here between, on the one hand, human marriage and infidelity and, on the other hand, socially monogamous, pair-bonding animals that sexually stray: the crucial difference being there is no evidence that he knows of, of animals policing each other; i.e. in voles, he says, the uninvolved third parties do not get upset at the vole who strays; well, he is not a vole so how would he know, but anyway... We now move onto the steamy topic of mistresses: there seems to be for him 'at least' anecdotal evidence that wealthy, high-status males not only marry serially but also have mistresses that they divert large funds to, which he says would be an interesting question to investigate but he does not actually know of empirical data on the subject. But, nevertheless he asserts that, clearly, our system of monogamous marriage is supported by particular romantic ideals, and therefore asks how such concepts of romantic love differ in polygamous societies.

The best he says that anthropology can tell us is that there is romantic love all over the place and that it is not some strange Western cultural notion, it is the idea that it should be linked to marriage which is the more unusual part. Marriage, according to Henrich is about 'building households', and this involves linking up kinship groups, so by the process he defines as 'cultural evolution' lots of societies have simply decided to take away the responsibility from the young couple in deciding who should mate because there are bigger things at play, while in the smaller scale human societies, it still seems to him that 'pair bonds' are created by romantic love, but these pair bonds are in his view 'not that durable'. It is social norms that are actually what makes the 'pair bond' more durable.

What appears very plainly in this anthropological ideology is that the family is an aesthetic state apparatus and as such has a history related to economic history and that in this paean to the state apparatus of modern monogamous marriage certain kinds of pair bonding are to be ruled out and others ruled in, and indeed we quickly lose sight of the democratic component that is supposed to be intrinsic to this family structure, which becomes subordinate to its utility as an economically functioning unit, the 'household'. The underlying lack of democracy in the basic assumption of female inferiority here needs no comment, it is obvious, so what appears as a constant is the necessity, within the 'law of the family' to subordinate a particular sex, and that this will and must be the female, though the reasons remain unstated and taken for granted. There is no understanding of the role that the family plays in reproducing the subject in society, which would inevitably lead us to question the production value of the female as the one who labors to reproduce the human subject.

But we also see in this account the general taboo over polygamy, and concomitant with this, the restriction of available gender types that we may perform by the policing (we may credit this understanding that there is indeed policing going on here though). It is as if the eight performances of gender that we have seen as underpinning all sexual performances need to be first restricted (to the four, two prescribed and two proscribed), before any sexism may operate 'properly'. And this is key because if we were to realize that the conditions of our sexuality were democratic (in our sense), then it is the opening of Pandora's Box, and not to a sea of 'anything goes' 'free sex' etc (which always worked out to extra freedom for the men anyway), but a wider and more subtle grasp of our sensual possibilities as true democratic sex. 

Extract from research for a book roughly entitled "Lenin and Democracy"

Marx Reloaded, A Film by Jason Barker: Review and Commentary

Thomas Riggins

Jason Barker's film, Marx Reloaded, was released in 2011. It is 52 minutes long and is now available for viewing on the internet. It was interesting to watch but it did not have a lot to do with Marx except superficially. If Marx was reloaded it was with blanks.

The film presents a series of talking heads many of whom have no grasp of what Marx and Marxism are all about and who engage in flights of "postmodern'' speculation as to the meaning of Marxism today. There are a few exceptions that I will note. There are also a few non-Marxist supporters of capitalism who don't see any future for Marx. There are no representatives from contemporary labor movements or political parties which are part of the ongoing Marxist tradition.

The question addressed is if Marx's critique of capitalism is valid for our time. If the critique is valid then what comes next? Is Communism going to make a return? Is it coming back to replace the capitalist system?

The film opens with an animation of Marx meeting Trotsky and Trotsky undertaking to enlighten Marx as to the significance of Marxism today. Trotsky will attempt to guide Marx to an understanding of how ideology works in society. Quite the tail wagging the dog.

The film then begins by asking how economists today explain the greatest capitalist crisis since the great depression of the 1930s. The answers we get are not very telling. Now the talking heads take over.

First up is the late former chief economist of the Deutsche Bank, Norbert Walter (1944-1912) who says that we [bankers] made mistakes. E.g., in the USA people could get mortgages at 110% of the value of their houses. The banks made money cheaply available, people borrowed too much and they couldn't pay back what they owed. Later in the film he tells us that Marx's ideas about getting rid of capitalism by abolishing a society based on commodity production for profit would create a world that people would not want to live in as that would lead to the abolishment of "the universal medium of money" which "turns everything around us into commodities" and "money is an essential medium for civilization, for peaceful coexistence and the organization of complex societies." This begs the question as communism is a complex society based on production for human needs not commodities for profit. Mr. Walter must have forgotten about the two world wars that almost destroyed European civilization in the last century when he opined that "peaceful coexistence" is one of the benefits of a money economy.

Next up is Eamonn Butler of the Adam Smith Institute, and author of "Taming The Trade Unions", who tells us the crisis was caused by inflation due to governments printing too much money. That is all we hear from him.

On a more general level of the problems of capitalism and the meaning of Marx's writing the film interviews several people identified as philosophers, political philosophers, theorists, critics, etc. Some are well known to the academic community although their grasp of Marxism may be questionable. We now hear from Antonio Negri, co-author of "Empire", an expert on Spinoza, and a founder of Italian Autonomism, and "Worker's Power" (Potere Operaio) an ultra-left formation in Italy with a secret armed wing. Negri tells us that the capitalists [neo-liberals] cannot pay the workers the price of their labor [which doesn't even make sense in Marxist terms-- a wage is the price paid for labor-- he should at least be talking about the value of their labor-power not the price] and that they remain in power and are able to wage wars around the world only as long as the working class remains quiescent  due to high wages. But as we see the capitalists can't do that so Marx is still relevant.

This line of thought is taken up by the film which now asks does Marx's theory of exploitation hold today or is the way capitalists make their profits changing? The answers are sought from more talking heads without any clear explanation having been given as to what Marx's theory of exploitation is. What is clear is that with a few exceptions, which I will note, none of the answers given in this part of film are dealing with Marx's theory.

The philosopher Slavoj Zizek is now up to bat (what film on "Marxism" would be complete without this latter day Eugen Dühring). He is described as the "leader" of a new movement to revive Marxist and Communist thinking. He revives Marx by proclaiming that the classical notion of exploitation [left unexplained] no longer works due to the knowledge explosion-- he does not tell us why this is so. However, it has something to do with computers because we need them to communicate with each other and so we have pay "rent" to Bill gates because he owns part of our mental substance. I am tempted to think that in professor Zizek's case Mr. Gates  is a slumlord. Finally we are told that we need a redefinition of the "proletariat" because the "proletariat" is larger than the working class. Zizek also notes that the unemployed today demonstrate because they want jobs-- "please exploit us in the normal way" they are saying to the capitalists. I think he strikes out as the "leader" of a new "Marxist" movement. He will appear again later.

Antonio Negri now reappears. Capitalism, he says, has evolved in ways Marx could not have predicted. Exploitation is not only of factory workers but of workers throughout society. You can't start a revolution with the factory workers-- you need them but also all the other workers too [I think Marx could have predicted this, in fact he already knew it.] You need the other workers, Negri says, because they are the "most" exploited. What can that mean? The examples he gives is of research and cinema workers and the like because they produce more value. None of this makes sense because the Marxist concept of "value," "surplus value," "labor power" and "exploitation" are never brought up in the film. If they were none of the things these talking heads and intellectual will o the wisps are saying would make sense anyway only the viewers would at least understand why.

Herfried Munkler now makes his appearance. Dr. Munkler, co-editor of the Complete Works of Marx and Engels and a professor at Humbolt University, in contrast to those who have appeared before, actually knows a thing or two about Marxism although in its Social Democratic deformation. His concern is not limited to discussing the plight of working people in the West but focuses on the exploitation of working people in the so-called Third World where working conditions are subhuman and wages are ridiculously low in comparison to the advanced capitalist countries. Here it is obvious that Marxist ideas are relevant and that capitalism is being abusive.

Michael Hardt, Antonio Negri's collaborator on the book "Empire" (not worth the read) now appears to bring us back from the Third World to the the First to tell us the economy is now centered on "immaterial" and "immeasurable" products-- that is, on "ideas" not on "objects" like old fashioned commodities such as cars, refrigerators, toasters-- the products of industrial manufacturing. Economics is about relationships and intangible assets [not, coal, oil or natural gas]. He is listed as a literary critic and political philosopher, at least he talks about political philosophy like a literary critic.

Now is the time for Jacques Ranciere, the co-author with Louis Althusser of "Reading Capital" (although his part was left out of the English version). He is noted for an educational theory which says a person can be a teacher without knowing anything about the subject he is going to teach; a view welcomed by not a few teachers. Ranciere makes three appearances in the film and manages to say nothing of importance in any of them.  Here he tells us many societies have had exploitation without "explosions" so we can't draw from exploitation the logic of an end to exploitation. Economic exploitation is not the dominant factor in all social struggle. Ranciere seems oblivious to the Marxist view that, as Engels says, in the last analysis all major social struggles in class based societies have economic exploitation at their root. Each society and its economic formation needs to be individually studied. There have certainly been "explosions" over exploitation in all societies that have distinct social classes despite Ranciere's contrary assertions.

The film now takes up a new subject. We are told that to understand capitalism we must delve into the the "mystic realm" of the COMMODITY.  It is certainly true that without an understanding of the origin and role of commodities we will not understand our economic system which is based on the production and exchange of commodities. Marx devotes the first chapter of "Das Kapital" to the commodity. It is a difficult chapter but once grasped the rest of the volumes of Das Kapital will be easily understood.

The film however does not deal with Marx's scientific analysis of commodities but skips to the last section of the chapter which is entitled "The Fetishism of Commodities." Without an understanding of the preceding sections it is easy to misunderstand this last section and, true to form, both the film's narrator and all of the talking heads in this part of the film completely miss the point and fail to grasp Marx's ideas concerning commodity fetishism.

To make a long story short, Marx's point is that the laws of the capitalist system are not  products of  nature as, say, are the laws of gravity or of aerodynamics but they are the result of human activity. Commodities and their relations are created by human beings and human beings can abolish them. Yet, because we are ignorant of the laws of economics we think of commodities as natural, as things which , although created by us, assume an existence independent of us and go to a market whose laws we are subject to and must conform to. This is similar to the creation of religions or "primitive" belief systems where a person creates a fetish and then bows down to it and thinks it has power over him and he must subject himself to its demands and will. The capitalist market appears as the natural form of economic exchange and there is no alternative to it.  It is not true that there is no alternative and humans can abolish capitalism and rid themselves of subjection to the laws of commodity production and create an economic world which serves human needs and one where human needs do not take second place to the need to exchange commodities at a profit. None of this is addressed in this part of the film. Instead we get baloney. This is because the talking heads are in the grips of the very fetishism Marx warns us about.

Norman Bolz (media theorist): "The theory of commodity fetishism is Marx's most important discovery." It isn't. Marx's most important discovery is the distinction between the value of labor and that of labor-power which is the basis of the labor theory of value and of his analysis of capitalism. It is, however, one of the most important consequences of that discovery.

Bolz continues by saying Marx's theory reveals a secret as to why capitalism today "functions so well" [!!!]. The secret is "that goods in the capitalist market place satisfy more than simple needs  they also convey a spiritual surplus value and this value is the real reason for the purchase." This is complete and utter nonsense.

Peter Sloterdijk (philosopher [but not a very good one]) is not so definite. He says the theory is probably "the important part of Marxist doctrine." This is because "Marx is among those who discovered the fact that things live."  He goes on to say, Walter Benjamin "discovered the structural similarity between human commodities [?] and commodities as objects." He thus "universalized the category of prostitution." While there may be a relationship between fetishism and prostitution on some level, I don't think this is what Marx was getting it. "Prositution is always present when a beautiful thing feigns life and tries to seduce passersby with an offer."  I think professor Sloterdijk should reread Marx's chapter on commodities.

Finally, here is Famonn Butler"s (policy analyst) take: he says it's human psychology to want things-- the economy is neutral-- it just produces what people want.  Well then, that's it. Capitalism just produces what people want. Then why are there so many adverts all over the place? Do we need to be constantly reminded about what we want?

The film now turns to Marxism and Ecology-- only by now Marxism has been unloaded rather than  reloaded. Zizek is now taking about  "Communism" in the sense what we have in "common"-- the Earth as our "common substance" and we have to manage it together. He makes no proposal about how to do that. Michael Hart is also back talking about the "common" in "Communism" and how different that is from both the "Communism" found in the Soviet Union (derived from Marx incidentally) and also the "Communism"  of American Anti-Communism [evidently he doesn't approve of either kind of "Communism"].

Herfried Munkler points out that Marx "applies exploitation not only to human labor but to the limited resources of nature. He says that if the exploitation of nature continues nature will be destroyed." Munkler thinks that we can reduce the exploitation of nature under capitalism and have common ownership of the Earth without  a Marxist society. But this is just social democratic optimism as befits anyone affiliated with the SPD in Germany. He gives no program. But at least he brings up an all important issue; the destruction of the environment under capitalism today.

John Gray weighs in with the observation that international capitalism develops in ways impossible to predict and impossible to control (revealing that he is completely under the sway of the fetishism of commodities). He says the "New Leninists" [we have not met any "Leninists" in this film-- nor will we] and "Greens" are correct about the fact that "human action" has destabilized the environment but they are "deluded" in thinking human action can restabilize it. It doesn't occur to him that it is not humans qua humans that are destructive but only humans under the sway of particular sorts of economic and social relations. Even if humans could get together as a global collective, which he says will never happen, they could not restabilize the environment. Doom and gloom is all we can expect.

The film now asks if the current economic crisis was caused by an under regulated banking system. Is the only solution now and in the future to have state regulated economic systems? The film suggests we look back into history for solutions. I should note here that people who look  to the past for solutions to present day problems are usually seen to be reactionaries.

Be that as it may, we return to Norbert Bolz who likes the fact that in the 19th century banks issued their own scripts which functioned as money. You could take it to another bank and redeem it in coin of the realm-- if the other bank trusted it! This system would make all the banks very aware of the true value of the scripts and bad banks would be exposed. He thinks this is a really good idea and I suppose there were no banking crises in the 19th century, except there were.

John Gray rightly thinks this idea is nuts because state monopoly capital [not his term] has become so evolved and complicated since the 19th century and this has happened as a result of the close interconnection between capitalism and state power-- there is no going back. But is there going forward?

Why is it that the state rushes in to save capitalism all the time? Is it possible, the film now asks, that these crises, like the one we are in right now, which broke out in 2007, are not side effects of capitalism but essential to its very existence?

Herfried Munkler tells us that Marx thought that crises would lead to the downfall of capitalism but since his day capitalism has gone through many crises and has "rejuvenated itself." He mentions Joseph Schumpeter's theory of crises as periods of "creative destruction." "Capitalism," Munkler concludes, "doesn't age. Instead crisis is its Fountain of Youth."  This from the co-editor of the Collected Works is rather strange. Marx thought the internal contradictions would eventually bring about capitalism's collapse (or the mutual destruction of the contending classes within the system) but there was no time table and he argued that capitalism had at its disposal many tools to stave off immediate collapse but it would eventually prove dysfunctional as had the economic forms (slavery, feudalism,) that preceded it. Schumpeters "creative destruction" (destruction of the lives of workers and the majority of the population and creative of wealth for the so-called 1%-- the capitalists) is no refutation of Marx's theories.

The "theorist" Alberto Toscano, one of the very few interviewed who seems to have his head in the right place, points out that capitalism, whatever its ultimate fate, is responsible for creating a gigantic surplus population that it does not know what to do with. He mentions the book "The Planet of Slums" by Mike Davis and talks about  the "surplus humanity" that capitalism has on its hands because its technological advances have made the number of workers it needs redundant. This is the "reserve army of labor" that Marx wrote about-- but now it is no longer a "reserve" it is just a surplus of human beings that are socially unneeded piling up in the slums of the world with nowhere to go. The "creative destruction" they may eventually bring about capitalism may have a hard time dealing with. Only the Chinese, with a non-capitalist economic system, seem to have been able to cope with the massive poverty in the rural areas  of their country (and of course Cuba and Vietnam and a few others with non-capitalist economies, and now Venezuela, are beginning to follow suit).

Finally, the film asks what sense is there in believing another world, other than capitalism, is possible. TINA-- There is No Alternative was Ms. Thatcher's motto-- was she correct? Can a Communist alternative emerge after the experiences of the past century?

  Antonio Negri says there is only capitalism so we must fight the bosses as the bosses fight us. This seems to be an eternal struggle-- there is only the movement Bernstein thought and so it seems  does Negri-- at least in this film-- it is difficult to get just what he means so I may be incorrect here. He tells us what we all know-- Russia didn't have "Communism" it had "socialism." What is socialism? It is a way to manage capitalism, just like liberalism is. How would Communism come about? It "comes into being through a relation between transformations of reality and the will or decision to do it or to build it." After this bit of balderdash  he leaves us with the admonition to junk the old Communist Manifesto  and to write a new one-- he is not , however, the man to do it.

Nina Power, feminist philosopher, has more regard for the Communist Manifesto, and says it has continuing power to influence people. She is surely correct.

Zizek writes off the 20th century "communist" states, Social Democracy, the idea of local councils, collectives, Soviets (which first popped up in the 1905 Russian Revolution) and their latter day reincarnations. What's left? He tells us he likes the idea that "A communist society is one in which each person could dwell in his own stupidity." Zizek is already doing that so he should be happy. He says he got that idea from reading Frederick Jameson. He thinks it would be great if Communism turned out to be like a Bruegel painting. Whenever I hear Zizek expostulating it brings to mind what Karl Marx said about Jeremy Bentham i.e., "in no time and in no country has the most homespun common-place ever strutted about in so self-satisfied a way." At least Bentham did not resort to pseudo-Hegelian verbiage.

Micha Brumlik (professor of education at the Goethe University of Frankfurt am Main) maintains that after the 20th century we have the right to know what Communism is going to be like-- it has to be democratic to be supported. There will be a big fight over that, I fear, as different concepts of "democracy" will be put forth. But he is right to demand a politically active civil society not divorced from a democratic political system. He thinks that Hardt and Negri's  unclear views on the "the multitude" will never get that concept up and running or have any practical outcome.

Jacques Ranciere leaves us with the view that while Marx wanted a "classless society" what we really need is what he calls an "emancipatory society." This is one "in which each has an equal share." This has a vague utopian sound to it-- a throwback to pre-Marxist French socialist thinking. Marxist logic, he tells us, is to prepare for the future, but he believes "instead that the idea of emancipation is really tied to a sort of appearance in the here and now of those we call the 'have-nots' and of those who make their presence felt through their capacity to think, to intervene politically  and to prove themselves capable of organizing economic production." Ayn Rand would like this-- the have-nots and their masters-- only for Ranciere they would be good masters. This is a latter day reincarnation of Plato's Republic.

Ranciere goes on to criticize Negri. "Negri thinks capitalism produces communism [in the film Negri appears to think capitalism is here for the long run and must always be struggled against-- or if communism comes about it will be through the triumph of the will-- few of the people in this film are logically coherent]. In reality, capitalism only produces its own form of communism. But this is not the communism of everyone's capacity. There are those who say 'Look at what capitalism does. The idea of communism can't be so bad.' But I don't think those people are involved in constructing the idea of real equality today." What is this rambling discourse suppose to mean?

The last pronouncement I will consider comes from Peter Sloterdijk, who tells us that "People must join together to forge alliances against the lethal. They must provide mutual security and offer each other communities of solidarity on a planetary scale [sounds like an advert for NATO]. Because for the first time collective self destruction is possible. [Is he referring to the bomb? climate change?] Before we say 'communism' we must understand the principle of 'immunism' [a new -ism to worry about] or the principle of our mutual insurance which is the most profound motive of solidarity."

This is the sum and substance of the movie. Some of these thinkers are better than they have appeared in this movie-- but not by much. I don't think this film has reloaded Marx-- quite the contrary. I think it completely fails to present what Marxism is all about and its past accomplishments and future possibilities. No film can hope to present Marxism to the public without at the same time dealing with the real life problems of the union and working class movements and issues in the Third World. As I pointed out at the beginning of this review this film completely ignores working class leaders and the leaders of political movements inspired by Marxism and confines itself to interviewing intellectual talking heads who, quite frankly, often don't know what they are talking about. You can find this movie on You Tube complete with subtitles. It is 52 minutes long, and once you have watched it I think you will agree with my assessment.

Notes on Stalinist Humanism, Italian politics and the 'Grillini'

I realized recently that it was hard to accurately name a certain type of 'communist' (an unusual situation in itself) that I regarded as having a retrograde effect in today's political arena, specifically in Europe. But now I think I've nailed it: Stalinist-humanists. These communists (or 'communists', it depends) come from the history of the notion of 'actually existing communism' and its post war social imperialist past, particularly the Soviet Union.

The idea that 'communism existed' was an error or at least a deviation from Leninist theory, given that what actually existed was socialism and continued class struggle (excepting with the previous main class relations inverted). - Post WWII Stalinism tended to assert that the class struggle was concluded for it. This state position was combined with the cult of personality and a socialist-but-imperialist foreign policy. - Both of these positions also deviated from Leninism. It is possible to trace the roots of this deviation but I shall not here, suffice to say WWII had a big effect (which is of course an understatement).

There are certain parties in Europe that owe their existence to a past allegiance to the Soviet Union, as is natural, and these often had or have a peculiarly fusty, conservative flavor which seems, today, extremely anti-radical, promoting a sort of humanist gradualism and compromise with, even fondness for, almost any fixed authority, even while being able to propagate classic Marxist critical analysis. One traditional reaction to this co-option with the state is to counteract this, 'within the fold' so to speak, through Trotskyist anarchism directed from outside the traditional corridors of bourgeois power, i.e. with an extreme 'militancy'.

The current European 'communist' movement is split by this division between Stalinism and Trotskyism, as played out in the political arena. It is, I suggest, a false dialectic that actually represents a threat to Marxist theory and practice in the day-to-day struggles we currently see in the severe global capitalist crisis. It is fairly apparent the bourgeois media enjoys this agonistic situation. 

- Not that I wish to create some kind of 'grand unity' here, and I recognize that often the arguments between factions are productive, and this isn't ever a pure thing, but what I suggest this represents, basically, is the repression of the Bolshevik position within current revolutionary communist politics and the splitting of an old Menshevik type position into two essentially humanist tendencies: Stalinist humanism and Trotskyist humanism.

Bolshevik versus Menshevik was an old struggle in revolutionary Russia that most comrades will know about. I am unable here to go into the details of the historical differences between them, but the Menshevik position tended to represent bourgeois reformist 'Marxism' in a more social democratic flavor, seeking to stick with the then existing bourgeois state structures. The Bolshevik position was that of the early revolutionary Soviet Union, one of its famous slogans was "All Power to the Soviets" (worker councils). 

In the S.U. the New Economic Policy and the war tended to reduce the impact of Bolshevism, even though Lenin was a revered Bolshevik figure. The embalming of Lenin's body after he died represents, I think, a stage in the eventual victory of this humanism, and reveals a resort to political social democracy within (a denegated) socialism in the Soviet Union's state apparatus - to cut a long story short of course.

We all recognize, even when we are sympathetic to the Soviet war-time experience, that the Soviet Union began at some stage in its later social evolution to resemble the more rightist type of authoritarian state, particularly in its superstructure and culture. It is a matter of irony that this statism derives from the return of humanism and social democracy, exactly what the external bourgeoisie decried as missing in such an 'authoritarian' or 'totalitarian country', but this is, I submit, the case. What else could it be? After all the normal bourgeois answer boils down to the idea that there is something innately wrong with all socialists.

Stalinist humanism is a bourgeois ideological variant of Marxism. As such it is a reversion to the Menshevik position, which is as I have described dualistic. It does not just contain Stalinism: the dualism derives from the way the Menshevik humanist position acts on the current political stage. Its gradualism and Statist reformism corresponds to the fondness for stability and authority that we see today among the 'communist' parties that cooperate within the European bourgeois parliamentary systems, while the sometimes sudden and forced realization that this is obviously not producing the desired social results ('actually existing communism') leads to, as it were, an extreme reaction that goes the opposite way: to a rejection of all gradualism, reform, and authority, even in socialism.

We should be quite familiar with humanist dualism as a bourgeois philosophy, it is a source of a lot of cultural angst, anguish and stress, the constant swinging from love and peace to extreme violence and hatred, because of its belief in and sometimes abandonment of (in disgust) the 'human spirit' and God; it goes back to Descartes at least and is tied into religion. Indeed it is to a large extent a religious attitude and aesthetic more than a strict ideological system and corresponds to the feelings of alienation that are not eliminated by the socialist state merely asserting that those problems have evaporated.

The Marxist philosopher Louis Althusser addressed in his work the subject of Marxist humanism and critiqued the phenomenon of cult of personality and Stalinism, but not from the standard rightist position, in fact he demonstrated that the rightist critique was actually the same position (theoretically) as Stalinism. It is also possible, though, as I think the above shows, to extend this critique into the modern political arena, for example the career of Giorgio Napolitano the Italian politician who has been the 11th President of the Italian Republic since 2006 and who has just been re-elected (April 2013) due to a political deadlock. He was a long-time member of the Italian Communist Party but later the Democrats of the Left, and served as President of the Chamber of Deputies from 1992 to 1994 and as Minister of the Interior from 1996 to 1998. The current radical intervention into parliamentary politics of Beppe Grillo's party has upset the old established left and right political cartel and false dialectic, but it has also discredited, thankfully, much of the Stalinist humanist conservative communists. At least at the moment M5S is more communist than the communists.

Russian Homeland Threatened by Feminism

Thomas Riggins

Vladimir Putin's government's crack down on Pussy Riot may have helped save the Russian Federation from the peril of creeping feminism. One of his government's closest allies, Patriarch Kirill who leads the Russian Orthodox Church, has just announced, according to Reuters, that feminism is a very dangerous ideology and could even lead to the destruction of the Russian Homeland. This makes it more dangerous than Communism which never threatened the existence of the homeland. It puts feminism right up there with Nazism which did threaten the existence of the homeland.  President Putin has said the Church is a protector of Russian national values, something he would never say about Pussy Riot. After having had over seventy years of a socialist government 75% of the people still identify with the Russian Orthodox Church (say it ain't so Joe!).

I don't want to contradict the Patriarch, who like the Pope, Pat Robertson, Billy Graham and some others may share a party line with Jesus, just report his wisdom to the laity. That wisdom consists of knowing what the true role of men and women is in the world and in society. After all, the organization represented by the Patriarch has been around for a couple of thousand years and has had plenty of time to figure this out, even if it had not been handed down from on high. The role of women is, as many men have always suspected the 3Ks, Kinder, Küche, Kirche (sorry for the German that's Children, Kitchen, Church).

Last Tuesday ( 4-10-13) the Patriarch stated: “I find very dangerous this phenomenon, which is called feminism, because feminist organizations proclaim a pseudo-freedom of women that should in the first place be manifested outside marriage and outside the family.”  Well, progressives should be against pseudo-freedom and it seems the Church thinks women can only find real freedom inside marriage [ presumably a gay marriage would not count ] and inside the family. This leaves Christian feminists, gay or otherwise, in an embarrassing position.

But where do men find freedom? The Patriarch said, " “Man turns his sight outward, he should work, make money. While a woman is always focused inwards towards her children, her home. " So it seems stay at home dads have pseudo-freedom while those lucky guys out in the factories and assembly lines, or anywhere they can make money, are enjoying freedom (even if they have to compete with pseudo-free women demanding equal opportunities).

It would also seem the more money the more freedom-- and this may actually be so in a capitalist economic system. Putin and Kirill may be on to something. They don't want communism [crypto-feminism, or is it vice-versa?] back in the homeland subjecting women to the pseudo-freedom of  jobs and daycare and trying to enslave men into doing housework (I'm not sure that was very successful anyway).

It is fairly obvious that feminist groups and organizations (and bands like Pussy Riot) are a grave danger not only to themselves but to the true function of womanhood in service to the KKK of freedom. The Patriarch warns "If this exceptionally important role of a woman is destroyed, everything will be destroyed as a consequence — family and, if you wish, the homeland.” Мой папа!

Well. we can't have that. But I doubt that the KKK is really in the best interests of women or even if the Patriarch is on the right party line. His calls may be coming from that other place. Maybe  Pussy Riot really should be performing in the Cathedral of Christ the Savior-- it has divine acoustics.

The Economy: Happy Days Are Here Again! For Whom?

Thomas Riggins

Last week the stock market made a great leap forward. "Dow Leaps to Record" the Wall Street Journal blazons on its front page (3/6/13). The news weekly The Week quotes Bernard Condon of the AP: "The stock market is back." ["Markets: Dow soars to a record high" 3/15/13] Investors and other social parasites living off of unearned capital gains are celebrating getting back the $11 trillion dollars eaten up by the Great Recession. The Week says this is seen "as another sign of recovery." The Wall Street Journal hails it as "a key milestone in the long slog to recovery from the financial crisis."

This remarkable "economic comeback" is even happening under the Obama administration-- which the Wall Street Journal and other right-wing prognosticators and prevaricators of presidential malfeasance have been telling us is running the economy into the ground and scaring investors away from the markets because of its anti-business "socialist" proclivities. Paul Krugman in The New York Times (3/8/13) quotes the op-ed of one these negative Nellies, Michael Boskin who advised presidents Bush 1 & 2 on economics: "Obama's radicalism is killing the DOW." Whose policies were it now that brought the stock market and the economy crashing down? I think they were those of the presidents being advised by Michael Boskin.

Now to be a wet blanket. The resurrection and coming again of the DOW is only one expression of the economy. The fat cat expression. What about people at the other end of the economic blight-- how are they faring. While the bankers and speculators who caused the Great Recession are partying on Wall Street the nation's homeless are increasing in numbers.  After reading the front page of the same issue of the Wall Street Journal celebrating "recovery" we find a quite different story on page 6: "New York City Leads Jump in Homeless."

New York City prides itself with being the leading city in the U.S. and under Mayor Bloomberg it has become first in the nation in homeless families. The city also set a new record for its homeless shelters-- 50,000 souls a night in January of this year. Revealing, the WSJ says "an unsettling national trend: a rising number of families without permanent housing." Higher stock prices and bigger bonuses for bankers do not a recovery make.

According to the Coalition for the Homeless (using numbers from January provided by New York City) 1% of all children in the city are in shelters (over 21,000) which is up 22% over last year (corresponding increases for Boston and Washington D.C. were 7.8% and 18% respectively). Mary Brosnahan, of the Coalition, said: "New York is facing a homeless crisis worse than anytime since the Great Depression." Some recovery!

Resources to help keep families in their homes have been cut by the Obama administration, advocates for the homeless say, in order to concentrate on the "more visible" problems-- i.e., getting those unsightly homeless from sleeping on the streets and in public areas where they can be, God forbid, seen.  So the money goes for shelters after the fact, not to keep people housed before the fact. But this did not start with Obama-- it goes back to the Bush years as homeless families have increased 73% since 2002 in New York City alone. The city reflects national trends. It has, for example, gotten back, in gross numbers, all the jobs lost since the Great Recession" began, according to the WSJ --but not really, as the the jobs are lower paying than those lost--- you don't come out even getting an once of silver for an once of gold just because you still have an once of something. When asked to comment the Department of Housing and Urban Development did not respond.

For the crisis in New York City the Bloomberg administration said it was the fault of, that abstract beast, "the economy."  Seth Diamond, NYC's commissioner of the Department of Homeless Services (a whole department for this!) was quoted in the WSJ as saying, "The economy is very different in the past years, and that is a substantial change. We understand we have an obligation to continue to work with people and provide shelter for those who need it, and the economy is nowhere near where it was."

Was it the fault of "the economy" that the State of New York ended aid to help people who got out of shelters to keep their new housing-- thus forcing them back out on the street? Ending that program resulted in a 35% increase in families in New York City shelters alone.

Was it the fault of "the economy" that in 2005 Mayor Bloomberg (forgetting his "obligation" to help people) ended a program from the 1990s that had been created to set aside some federal housing units and vouchers managed by the city for homeless people so they could get out of the shelters and live normal lives? We can't accept that being homeless is the "new normal."'

No, it's not the fault of "the economy" it is the fault of politicians that prioritize aiding the rich and well off at the expense of everyone else; of politicians who would rather see children thrown out on the streets than raise, even minutely, the taxes on the bloated incomes of the rich squeezed out of the labor of working people as well as grants and subsidies they get from the Congress corrupted by lobbyists and corporate contributions.

The "Great Recession" is not over and never will be no matter how high the stock market goes as long as homelessness, unemployment, low wages, and the persecution of unions and their members continues. The American people voted for a progressive government and they must now unite to see that the forces of reaction which refuse to recognize the choice of the people are driven from the centers of power and an end put to their obstructionism and attempts to undermine popular democracy. Only then will "Happy Days Be Here Again" or at least the possibility for them.

The Question of Stalinism and the Modern Protest

by Gary Tedman

The organized and deliberate horror of the system that produced Auschwitz stands as a kind of philosophical toll-booth at which we cannot seriously pay in the same old currency anymore, and once we have passed through it everything must be in a new currency, a different one. Let me put this even stronger: fascists made Auschwitz and the other death camps, and Communists opposed it, all those who are not with the Communists, are with the Fascists, it is not possible to take any other position: that system forbids this, completely and utterly.

To be sure, the WWII and post WWII situation was and is complex, and the lines to be drawn are not easy, but I maintain these are the real lines.

Notwithstanding, many people, groups, have passed through this toll-booth without changing their currency and are, as it were, living the illusion that things remain the same as before.

The rationalization for this is invariably 'Stalinism' and the associated 'Gulag'. 

The image of an equal and opposite horror to Hitlerism is there and keeps the old currency going in this new territory, it is there to rewrite history, in the end it is there, no matter its reality, its reasons for being, or not, for the moment, to tell us that the Auschwitz system did not really exist, or if it existed, it was just the opposite of an equally horrible horror that it opposed, in effect, to tell us that it is 'just like' an extreme version of the daily politics that we all know so well.

This means most people are in fact, though they don't know it, communists. They are because they obviously oppose this fascism, but they do not know they are communists. There are a few fascists who have the knowledge of what they are doing, and they are largely in positions of power and wealth, although of course there are also fascists among the poor and working class, those who have been brutalized. Nevertheless, low level fascism (for want of a better name) represents a quite different phenomenon to high level fascism. The Brownshirts (the Sturmabteilung) functioned as a paramilitary organization of the National Socialist German Workers' Party (or Nazi Party) are an example of this difference, and they had to be dispatched by the higher level Nazis, as we know, in the infamous 'Night of the Long Knives'. The key to grasping this difference is that the Brownshirts could not be trusted to 'do the right thing', which was to attack and blame minorities, chiefly for economic problems, rather than the ruling class.

Allow me to provide an example that will make this philosophical-political position clearer:

In Greece there was a coalition government (February 2012), which coalesced because they all agreed on some basic principles, and wanted to 'rescue' the Greek economy and nation, one method to do this was to introduce some extreme 'austerity measures' for the population: - sackings, redundancies, public and private sector wage/salary cuts and freezes, increased taxes, privatizations. The coalition was formed by the two main parliamentary parties PASOK ('socialist')/New Democracy (rightist) plus some extreme rightist fascists. These parties were led respectively by Georges Papandreou, Antonis Samaras and Georges Karatzaferis, the latter a party leader who has openly used anti-Semitic phrases and slogans. Essentially, the fascist held the deciding vote, in spite of the fact that he represented a tiny minority of the citizens of Greece in electoral terms.  This coalition was led by an 'installed' (by the Eurozone state apparatus) Prime Minister, Lucas Papademos, described as a 'technocrat' whose political affiliation remained 'officially' undecided but who was a banker with a history not unconnected with the causes of the crisis. 

The question arises: why would anyone, or any party, enter into an alliance with the extreme rightist, fascist party unless they had something in common with them? We were of course made aware officially that this was not the case. The other leaders always disavowed any connection of this type. Yet here we have, de facto, a close political relationship.

My argument is that what we saw in front of our eyes, we saw because it is true and fact, it is the reality. 

The coalition represented at bottom like minds, it represented agreements, similar goals and aspirations, and so on. It means that they are the same, an identity. This means conversely that the opposites that we thought the apparent left Socialists and right New Democracy were, in fact, fake. In reality they are performing a double act, a false dialectical piece of theater that allows us to vote for each party as if we were deciding a sports match, who after the spectacle share in the spoils. 

Why? They do this because they do share in the spoils, because they share class interests, and these interests are their private interests. In the Greek coalition of that time it reached a point in the economic crisis where those interests were best served through an alliance with the fascists. This is because any individual party holding power would be held to blame as responsible for the austerity that they both wanted to impose, so a coalition would neatly spread the blame and unpopularity as well as allow each to blame the other, in other words it allows the false dialectical double act to continue relatively unscathed (in theory, because this was happening against a backdrop of continuous protests). But it only allowed this to continue with the assistance of the fascists: only the fascists had the same interests at heart. Only the fascists had the same ruthlessness and brutality.

The two major left parties did not enter into this coalition and opposed it. This group included the Greek Communist Party (KKE), ostensibly a Stalinist party. We have, therefore, here the fascists versus the communists, although few involved would have accepted this as an accurate description, in fact they would of course have rejected it outright in indignation. And the reason why this description would not be accepted, and so strenuously, is because parliament must (it is an imperative), function as a stage on which political conflicts take place and argue democratically, and this entails of course that they are and must be opposed to each other, except in times of necessary national unity or emergency; i.e. they must really be opposed for this to be a genuine democracy, because democracy means choice. If we were to find that these parties were not really opposed but in fact shared their outlook, we would realize that we were living in a plutocracy, a dictatorship, not a genuine democracy, because changing the one to the other by election would really be no change at all.

Now, it is not that real opposition never ever happens in this structure. The fact of the necessity to perform on this stage means that they must do certain things, intervene, make political decisions, and so on, politics must be seen to be done and so it must often be done in fact on the stage that is parliament. However, the idea that they are opposed in any fundamental way is false as far as this structure is concerned; they are only opposed as factions within the one position of the rule of the ruling class. This is the key to understanding all bourgeois democracy. It is its classical form, as with the English Parliament (there are of course always exceptions).

We are using the metaphor of a stage here, but this is more than a metaphor; it really is a stage with actors performing roles. The political effect is chiefly the response of the audience to this performance, not the laws they put into effect. The laws are always decided beforehand by the class that the politicians are drawn from, or that they now de facto represent as politicians. The role of the parliamentary politician is to sell these political decisions. Apart from a stage performance with the actors, the process also more than resembles the performance of a conjurer, as well as has something of a comedic double act, with the classic straight man (who is funny and who is straight depends on your sidedness) or the classic nice cop v nasty cop routine. It is therefore no accident that the parliament resembles a stage set, it is a stage set. It is a place in this sense where art meets politics in a very pure way, the design must be right, the rituals and aesthetics of it all must add to the effect, in fact you might say it is a site where there are 'special effects' and a special atmosphere created. If politics is show business for ugly people, then this is their special stage.

All modern political arguments seem to lead to a single argument and question: to Stalin versus Hitler. It was for this reason that Godwin created his 'law' of blogs, although it mainly refers to Hitler and Nazi comparisons (although it may also be expanded to imply any of this type of figure); Wikipedia:

"Godwin's law (also known as Godwin's Rule of Nazi Analogies or Godwin's Law of Nazi Analogies[1][2]) is a humorous observation made by Mike Godwin in 1990[2] that has become an Internet adage. It states: "As an online discussion grows longer, the probability of a comparison involving Nazis or Hitler approaches 1."[2][3]  In other words, Godwin observed that, given enough time, in any online discussion—regardless of topic or scope—someone inevitably criticizes some point made in the discussion by comparing it to beliefs held by Hitler and the Nazis.

(…)

There are many corollaries to Godwin's law, some considered more canonical (by being adopted by Godwin himself)^[3] than others.^[1] For example, there is a tradition in many newsgroups and other Internet discussion forums that once such a comparison is made, the thread is finished and whoever mentioned the Nazis has automatically lost whatever debate was in progress.^[8] This principle is itself frequently referred to as Godwin's law. It is considered poor form to raise such a comparison arbitrarily with the motive of ending the thread. There is a widely recognized corollary that any such ulterior-motive invocation of Godwin's law will be unsuccessful.^[9]

Godwin's law applies especially to inappropriate, inordinate, or hyperbolic comparisons of other situations (or one's opponent) with Nazis."

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Godwin%27s_Law

Whilst the 'law' does not and should not prevent genuine discussion of Nazism and Hitler or fascism where this is relevant, it is often used (wrongly) on blogs in precisely this way, to prevent discussion of the history, specifically of Europe and its last world war. At the same time, the 'blog law' tends to function to deny (whilst secretly recognizing it as a phenomenon) that all blog discussions seem to be inexorably drawn towards the political issue that the last world war was fought over: fascism versus communism. 

Blogs are merely an example of a kind of cultural injunction, almost a taboo that exists in this space. In this sense it tends to act as a prohibition against recognizing everything stated above about the two great camps of politics. Stalin/ism is the real focus of the law. The argument regarding Stalin, Stalin's existence, acts as the universal position that says we may pass through the toll booth without changing our political-philosophical currency. It also says that any defense of Stalin is 'beyond the pale', even more so than Hitler. We may not discuss Stalin even in the context of Nazism, because to do so would be to challenge the accepted ideological norm of a 'balance' of forces, of bourgeois politics as the great balancer between two extremes that are essentially the same, two forms of evil, which of course we all know as the Cold War ideology.

This ideology was the post war switch in the Allies entire ideological position from support as an ally of the Soviets to outright antagonism. It was the switch necessary (whatever the actual complex circumstances) so that the ruling class and capitalism could return to its pre-war narrative of the evils of socialism, a switch it had to make, and was successful in making. For this reason the anti-Stalin position is essential to this ideology. The existence of an evil figure on the Left is essential to the modern concept of democratic politics and the entire notion of political 'extremes' of Left and Right balanced by universalist humanism, extremes which, on the contrary, are the only real political positions that exist today, after the Holocaust.

Are we saying that Stalin and Stalinism did not really exist, that the 'phenomenon' is a figment of bourgeois illusion making, that it is not as evil or equal to Hitlerism, are we saying that Stalin's opposition to Hitler was pure and progressive, 'the good', etc? No, such would hardly be a proper Marxian analysis; but it will be worth looking at the trajectory of the main proponent of the 'evil Stalin as equal to Hitler' ideology.

The Great Purge is supposed to be the fault of Stalin/Stalinism and 'his evil'; Wikipedia (I must say I support this mode of information and see no problem with it) again:

"The Great Purge was a series of campaigns of political repression and persecution in the Soviet Union orchestrated by Joseph Stalin from 1936 to 1938.[1][2] It involved a large-scale purge of the Communist Party and government officials, repression of peasants, Red Army leadership, and the persecution of unaffiliated persons, characterized by widespread police surveillance, widespread suspicion of "saboteurs", imprisonment, and arbitrary executions.[1] In Russian historiography the period of the most intense purge, 1937–1938, is called Yezhovshchina (Russian: ежовщина; literally, the Yezhov regime), after Nikolai Yezhov, the head of the Soviet secret police, NKVD.

In the Western World, Robert Conquest's 1968 book The Great Terror popularized that phrase. Conquest was in turn inspired by the period of terror (French: la Terreur) during the French Revolution."

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Great_Purges

Conquest then joined the Foreign Office's Information Research Department (IRD), a unit created for the purpose of combating communist influence and actively promoting anti-communist ideas, by fostering relationships with journalists, trade unions and other organizations.^[1] In 1956, Conquest left the IRD and became a freelance writer and historian. Some of his books were partly distributed through Praeger Press, a US company which published a number of books at the request of the CIA.

(…)

Some critics have argued that examination of archives following the USSR's collapse in 1991 challenge many of Conquest's statements.[15]

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robert_Conquest

Now, Robert Conquest's personal role in this construction is pivotal in that it is his work that generally feeds into the mainstream media and consciousness as 'the truth' about the Soviet Union (SU) and Stalin as an evil figure representing the SU, and it turn representing all forms of (should we say consistent or authoritative) Left socialism. It is not exactly difficult to detect that he is an agent (whether factually or not) of that thing known as 'the west' (if we treat this term as synonymous with advanced democratic capitalism), and that his ideology fits into the rightist framework of understanding history, and the fact that he started as a Communist only adds to this. 

One of the primary ways that he derives huge figures for death rates in the purges is by adding together the deaths from famines. Apart from this simple subterfuge, these famines were a feature of Russian life (and death) long before the Soviets came to power, and the Soviets were of course trying to eradicate them. The other salient aspect of this, however, is the background ideology or philosophy at work here, and the concept of the 'terror', the idea of an all powerful evil force to which any death or destruction may be attributed in a society. Now, it is noticeable that such an ideology is itself rather 'Stalinist', in the sense that it really believes and asserts repeatedly that such an evil overarching quasi-mystical force is actually possible and exists and operates as a factor in history.

The Marxist philosopher Louis Althusser has already remarked on this in his criticism of the rightist interpretation and critique of Stalinism, and counterpoised to this a very different left critique of same that looks at the problem of the cult of personality (in Essays in Self Criticism).

In November 2005 Conquest was awarded the Presidential Medal of Freedom by George W. Bush, a president infamous of course for cajoling the fabrication of the existence of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) as the excuse for the gung-ho invasion of Iraq to effect 'regime change'. It is noteworthy that President Bush, acting for his class, after the terrorist atrocity of 9/11 used the concept of a widespread 'War on Terror' as the reason to justify the invasion of another nation unrelated to this act of terrorism, and as a rationale for many other reductions in US civil rights at home, also unrelated (unless we mention class). In this way the rightist vision of history of the SU functions to generate just the kind of political conditions that are conducive to the rightists own political aims for a 'strong state', and very peculiarly in other words 'Stalinist' conditions, but minus any socialistic content. To put it more simply: Stalinism here becomes the rationale for Stalinism.

From another direction, may we not assert that Stalinism, or more specifically Hitlerism (which we seem to have forgotten), may justifiably be a real excuse for Stalinism, or a 'strongman', if we are faced with fighting a truly terrible despotic force, one of those earthbound mundane evils that may not have mystical projective powers but certainly cause a great deal of grief and destruction. Every nation, even democracies, do indeed have a way to resort to emergency laws, martial law, and the 'strongman', and we all know that Churchill represents just such an historical figure, a hero for most, but who also had a personal history and reputation that on close inspection cannot be denied of being ruthless and at times cruel (i.e. earlier in Africa, or as regards the firestorm bombing of Dresden and Hamburg).

Attached to all this is the way this same rightist fantasy of evil and good ultimate powers leads also to the repeated insistence on peace as opposed to violence, as if one side (the rightist one) somehow owns the rights to peace as such. The suggestion is that there are, again, two fundamental forces at work: those who want peace and those who are hell bent on 'mindless' destruction and death. 

Lately (in 2011) this argument came to be used against the Arab Revolutions in the Middle East and North Africa, and against the uprisings of the Tunisian, the Bahraini, Libyan, Egyptian, Yemeni and Syrian peoples, etc. The suggestion is that these uprising have been generated by a kind of will to violence and that the existing state and the stasis it produces is in contrast necessary for peaceful 'stability'. What we find is that the institutions of the state, because it only presents a bureaucratic violence which is insidious and hidden, is framed as peaceful, while protesters who resist repression with an open vigor are regarded as 'violent'. 

Recently this same argument has been leveled at Greek protesters in the context of the (seemingly never ending) negotiations by the Greek government with the troika (the ECB, IMF and EU) that offered to the Eurozone currency group of nations even further austerity measures that were forcing the nation into penury and its people into ever deepening poverty. Protesters, normally peaceful, are in Greece often accompanied (except for the Communists who resisted this) by groups of other protesters (or rioters) who act in an immediately and rather too ready way with violence against the state riot police, who then have the convenient excuse to heavily tear-gas the protesters.

On one occasion in Greece during such protests (February 2012) it was (on video evidence that is widely documented on the internet) the riot police which first began the violence by firing down into the packed crowd of protesters, only after this did the stone throwers begin attacking the riot police, who began their familiar routine of surrounding the mass of peaceful protesters and herding them by copious amounts of teargas. To cut the story short, on this night many shops and buildings, including historic ones, were the next day reported as burnt out, smashed and looted. Some were ostensibly targets of Left wing rage – such as the HQ of the fascist party (Laos), or some were loosely connected to this apparent agenda (the cinema which had been used as a Gestapo torture chamber, as well as banks). The destruction was quite widespread. Naturally the Greek press and the government mostly, but not totally, avoided the question of parastatal elements involved in agent provocateur acts, and described the violence in terms of wanton thuggery and 'mindless evil'. 

In the UK comparisons were made sometimes to the recent English riots and looting (which nevertheless also gave rise to questions over the sudden reluctance or inability of the nation's police to contain it). The narrative was clear: protest against the state was a form of terror and evil that had to be eradicated, and reflected that there was something fundamentally wrong with the Greek people. This came after months of descriptions on blogs etc of Greek people as lazy and inefficient, too expecting of 'entitlements', and 'not living within their means' and thus needing constant loans in the crisis.

The Greek people, and its kind of state, were essentially becoming the scapegoats for the global capitalist crisis in the western media. The case of Ireland was financially at least as grave, if not worse, than Greece, but all the concentration was on the plight of Greece as a 'special case'. This barely hidden racism, since it had no justification in rationality (in fact in the blogs it was hardly concealed at all, and was allowed as if 'fair comment'), on a broader level was reflected in the insulting name for the badly affected southern states, PIIGS (for Portugal, Ireland, Italy, Greece and Spain). 

Tellingly, these are all states which still had unfinished business to deal with after the last world war: for instance the legacy of the Junta in Greece and of Franco in Spain; Greek people were actually still in the process of trying to gain some war reparations from Germany over a well known massacre of civilians. Disregarding the doubts over who is responsible for the violence of the protesters, we have here, I would argue, two kinds of violence presenting itself: the one is state violence and the other is people's force resisting this. Part of the state violence, when it is not tear-gassing people, is 'peaceful', in the sense that it presents itself ostensibly at least through lawful methods and bureaucratic processes to implement austerity. Some of these methods are doubtful in terms of their Greek constitutional legitimacy, but we can leave that aside too. 

What is austerity? It is the systematic reduction in the living standards and welfare benefits of the ordinary people of Greece (and other nations). These are generally not the people who were or should be held responsible in the sense of punishment for the global crisis, but who seem to be being treated as such, and we must place this in the European context of big bankers still receiving colossal financial rewards even for their total failure and need to be bailed out from the public purse, i.e. the very people who were being 'punished'. The people of Greece were and are very angry about this situation and they resist it. They feel (obviously) justified in this resistance.

What happens? A few buildings, property, some historic, get burnt in the struggle, little proof of who did it (the earlier Marfan bank atrocity may be the exception). The bourgeoisie are generally horrified. In actual fact the media horror expressed at the buildings and shops being burnt down as a result (apparently) of the anger over the severe state imposed austerity seems to be far higher than, say, passion against the massacres of civilians taking place concurrently in the city of Homs in Syria, who the UN and Arab League have failed miserably to protect even in words. For this we get mere sadness and some mild hand wringing, even prominent Left figures (such as Seamus Milne of The Guardian newspaper) walks away from the Syrian issue saying it is too 'toxic' and offered no plan of action even for the Left. 

In the UK, persons have been arrested and imprisoned for supporting and encouraging the riots in words only, such as through the new social media. So in this sense free speech is being curtailed over an issue that could be aired in this respect: is violent rioting (even, in contrast to protesting) never legitimate? Is the expression of anger by the people never justified? 

Let us forget for the moment the easy way in which the rightists will confuse and conflate, deliberately and for their own project, riots with protest. Is it never ever justified? Wanton destruction is only wanton and mindless when it has absolutely no point to it. To fulfill this it would have to be to all intents and purposes mad, i.e. psychopathic, and in that sense would lead us to a different problem since psychopaths are not considered responsible subjects. Such destruction as we have seen in Greece is not psychopathic though, it is anger about something and in response to a definite political event. You might say it is an expression (if genuine) of – if you attack me this way, I will attack you this way. The working class and people are unable to defend themselves or express their anger through legal constitutional means from the austerity measures that are (against the legal Greek constitution anyway, and even against the principles, at least, of the European Charter) reducing their lives in fact, so all that is left is (apparently) illegal methods. 

It is clear that by calling these methods 'mindless' (the repeated refrain in the press) as well as naming it 'rioting' is a way to link ordinary peoples protest to the general idea of 'terror'. To fight this 'terror' the (Greek in this instance) state feels justified in its violence or its own 'terror' as a way of combating it, so it resorts to the 'Stalinist' position (or perhaps we should say the Hitlerist in this case). If we add to this the suspicion that the state is encouraging and/or allowing this response and see that parastatal elements are included, then a picture emerges of a state itself going beyond legality, becoming an illegitimate state, a state which is no longer interested in performing its democratic function with regard to its people but only interested in its survival as a form of power become arbitrary and beyond law.

It is this kind of arbitrary power, which is being ascribed to radicals constantly under the name of Stalinism, yet arises from the position of Stalinism (or Hitlerism), which says we must not voice this position as the people, even as a concern about power, and we must accept that we all want 'peace', even though this is a peace which kills us: what is, we must ask, the ultimate austerity measure, do we not already know? Yes we do, it as Auschwitz. The same people who would call this hyperbole would call those who alluded to the early indications of the rise of the Nazi party and its dangers as conspiracy mongers and paranoiacs. 

There is a fundamental and deep hypocrisy at work here and it can be simplified down to this: they, the bourgeoisie, feel it is wrong to make a revolution, to overthrow an oppressive regime if there is nothing for them to gain from it. In Libya there was something to gain for capitalists from intervention: politically Gaddafi had appeared sometimes in the popular press as 'socialist', so intervention could be seen to be both anti-socialist (a strategic political gain), and there was oil present, plus the geography and demography helped, it was 'doable'. In Syria this was not the case, and the much vaunted democratic moral imperatives did not play a strong role, all the capitalist nations failed (at least in the first months, as I began to write this) in their self appointed 'duty' (including China and Russia). If Syria is a bourgeois revolution with working class components as well as an independence struggle against foreign tyranny, and as well as against home grown corruption and despotism, the world's bourgeoisie can only, at the moment, see its working class aspect, its courage and real violent resistance, as a threat.

Note

An additional aspect of the problem of Stalin and Stalinism is a historical difficulty: if this were to be taken as true, how may we approach the bare fact that the Soviet Union and Stalin was an ally during the war and that our (say, British) press was affectionate towards the figure of Stalin (Uncle Joe etc)? Should we 'westerners', to be consistent, say that this 'realpolitik' (at best) was complicity in war crimes? This would of course be very awkward and in fact of course it does not happen, in its place there is a void, the question is not confronted, it is simply never grappled with. Instead a kind of historical anachronism is produced, wherein, if 'we' ever think it, for the duration of the war it was 'normal' to be allies with the Soviet Union, but now, after a certain dividing line in time, it is not, and this 'doublethink', although contradictory, coexists. Common ideology has no inbuilt necessity, after all, to be consistent.

The existence of this line of demarcation, the division of future from past and the inability to rationally configure the one by and with the other, creates an historical anachronism and leads to a kind of violence in the present, based on it. For, if we cannot address this, it is a kind of repression. What is being repressed? If we were projected back to, say, Europe 1943, a British subject could not so easily openly exclaim "Stalin is an evil bastard", but now it is the reverse, if you do not claim he is an evil bastard you are an evil bastard. The violence here is that which prevents us from examining this as a genuine historical and ideological problem. It prevents us from researching the subject matter in a serious way. The only option that appears to be open to us is to strike the rightist attitude and interpretation of history. 

As stated, this rightist attitude does not exactly replace the figure of Stalin with anything much other than its own vision of a 'strong man', i.e. with its own Stalinism (e.g. Putin for instance). The violence of ideology is always based in this rejection of rational discourse, but the rejection does not appear so much in ideology, since it is irrational and therefore in a sense outside of ideas, but in affective practice, or in the affective practice that accompanies the ideology and appears at the moment it becomes aware that the line of demarcation and the prohibition is being challenged somehow, which in this case is a kind of historical line. In other words, it surfaces as an emotional response. This emotional response is, after the fact, usually excused through moral and ethical terms: with indignation, horror, astonishment, bluster, apoplexy, and a shutting down of the lines of rational communication, and then, censorship, the final act of which is to actually kill. And yes, ironically, Stalinism (if it is indeed what they say it is) itself followed this course, even (and this is the sad aspect of it) after it became unnecessary for the ruthlessness of war. We have in the Stalinist insistence on the end of class struggle in socialism the illusions of the post war Soviet state, since a state, of course, cannot be the end of class struggle given its end is the ending of the necessity for a state (this is the simple, basic, Leninist principle).

This is why here, on this ground, socialism grew its own, home grown, false dialectic. On the one side we have the notion of gradualism and total cessation of struggle in Stalinism, and on the other the ideas of the total continuation of continual revolutionary struggle in Trotskyism. What this represents is actually the same repression, in the end the repression of the science of social change that is Marxism, by being happier with the condition of stasis produced by holding apart these two sides and preventing synthesis. Why should this happen within socialism (ignoring the antagonistic pressure from outside)? A provisional answer may be this: socialism has no magic immunity from ideology, and especially from the ideology of its own victories and disappointments. There is an ideology of Marxism as much as any other politics, in fact even more so because of what is at stake.